And about. representative of the Russian Orthodox Church Alexander Shchipkov: dossier | Help

Shchipkov Alexander Vladimirovich

1957

Russian Orthodox Church

Third generation of modernists

Graduated from: Smolensk Pedagogical Institute

Taught at: St. Petersburg State University, RPU

Organizations: Inter-Council Presence of the Russian Orthodox Church, Synodal Department for Relations of the Church with Society and the Media, Methodological Council for Covering Religious Topics in the Media at the MPTR, New Politics (center), Public Council of the Russian Federation on Television, Expert Council for State Religious Studies Expertise under the Ministry Justice of the Russian Federation, Guild of Religious Journalism, Council of Public Television of Russia, Club of Orthodox Journalists, World Russian People's Council

Press: Community (magazine), “Friendship of Peoples”, “St. Petersburg Vedomosti”, “Smena” magazine, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, “Literary Gazette”, “New Time”, “Questions of Philosophy”, newspaper “Rating” (St. Petersburg ), Christian News Agency, Smena newspaper, What Russia Believes (program), Religion and Media (Internet portal), New Politics (website), Peoples of Russia website, Mayak radio station

Influenced by: Dudko Dmitry Sergeevich

Direction: social Christianity

,
immoralism
,
Church reform
Modernism

(August 3, 1957 - ) - modernist publicist, Christian socialist, immoralist. Activist of Church reform.

education

In 1978, he was struck down in social rights and expelled from the Smolensk Pedagogical Institute (Faculty of Foreign Languages) from the fifth year with the wording: “for behavior incompatible with the title of a Soviet student.”

In 1994, he received permission to complete his education, interrupted in 1978.

From 1998 to 1999 he taught at the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University.

In 2000, under the scientific supervision of Academician L.N. Mitrokhin, he defended his candidate’s dissertation at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the specialty “social philosophy” on the topic “Christian Democratic movements in post-Soviet Russia”[4].

In 2021, he was appointed dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the Russian Orthodox University of St. John the Theologian[5].

Exhumation of fascism (Alexander Shchipkov)

The Aletheia publishing house in St. Petersburg published Alexander Shchipkov’s book “Traditionalism, liberalism and neo-Nazism in the space of current politics.”

“Modern liberals have no other morality than the most archaic ancient idea of confrontation between “civilization and barbarism,” and this is due to the appeal of Western elites to new forms of colonialism, which were absolutely impossible during the period of rivalry between the two social systems in the second half of the last century. Until the twentieth century, the ideology of European colonialism was framed in terms like “the white man’s burden” and “the need to civilize the savages.” “This vocabulary became outdated precisely when Marxism was gaining strength. Under his influence, such phenomena as global dependence and global inequality were first described in the language of political economy,” the author emphasizes. If during the Cold War it was about the confrontation between ideologies and socio-political systems, now, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the liberal mainstream is again returning to the doctrine of open colonialism.

Turning to an analysis of the reasons for the growing influence of far-right neo-fascist and neo-Nazi movements in modern Europe, Shchipkov criticizes the myth of right-wing Western political scientists that fascism was just a response to communism. “From a historical point of view, fascism is by no means a reaction to communism; it stems from the conditions and political-economic factors of liberal capitalism,” notes Shchipkov. The author convincingly proves that the most accurate definition of the class essence of fascism was given in the 30s of the twentieth century by the leader of the Bulgarian communists Georgi Dimitrov. “Fascism is an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, the most imperialist elements of finance capital.” The main thing in this definition, the author believes, is the establishment of a direct connection between fascism as an ideology and the power of financial capital. “From this connection it follows that fascism is a continuation of the far-right neoliberal ideology - the ideology of big capital. In this regard, it becomes clear why left-wing social democrats and communists have always emphasized the connection between fascism and capitalism, while the liberal theory of “totalitarianism” fundamentally denied this connection,” notes the author.

In the chapter “Binary Theory of Totalitarianism: Limits of Applicability,” the author calls this concept a largely outdated relic of the Cold War.

“A natural question arises. Why, having at our disposal the concepts of “communism” and “fascism” (and any of them can be the subject of moral assessments), introduce a third concept that occupies a meta position in relation to the first two and levels out their specific characteristics? Probably to get away from historical specifics.” A. Shchipkov o.

A. Shchipkov, analyzing the numerous ideological manifestations of neo-Nazism and Russophobia and the direct crimes of modern Ukrainian neo-fascists - Bandera, identifies the reasons for the rapprochement between respectable representatives of Western democracy and extreme right forces in Ukraine. He believes that the alliance between neoliberals and far-right radicals is not an accident or a temporary tactical ploy, but a pattern arising from their ever-increasing ideological community. At the heart of this paradoxical at first glance, but only at first glance, symbiosis is an apology for the ideas of social, national, cultural and civilizational inequality. In modern Ukraine, we could observe how, under pro-European and nationalist slogans, at the same time, with the support of Western democracies, real democratic institutions, interethnic harmony and the foundations of statehood were destroyed. One can recall the example of Chile during the Pinochet era, where, in order to implement a right-wing liberal economic course, a fascist-type military dictatorship was established with the support of the United States.

At the same time, one can hardly fully agree with the author’s opinion that “in Russia, unlike the United States, liberalism does not follow, but goes against the national tradition.” As you know, truth is always concrete. In modern Russia, we should rather talk about the reactionary role of comprador liberalism and its political representatives, in the past the parties “Union of Right Forces” and “Right Cause”, who naturally lost the support of voters and their successors and ideological heirs in the person of the oppositionists from the RPR party - PARNAS and "Party of Progress" of A. Navalny.

Strictly speaking, liberalism in the era of bourgeois revolutions, and in Russia there was one of the most belated bourgeois revolutions in Europe, played an unconditionally progressive role. Since the time of the Great French Revolution, with its slogans of Freedom, Equality and Fraternity, liberalism has acted as the idea of formal equality of all citizens as opposed to feudal conservatism, which lagged behind the privileges of the aristocracy and monarchical absolutism. The socialist movement added to the liberal values of the legal equality of people the idea of social equality, the struggle for social equality and the rights of the oppressed fourth estate of proletarians.

It is no coincidence that during the Second World War it was the union of Western liberal democracies and Soviet communism that objectively defended universal human values and the foundations of civilization from the racial theory of German National Socialism, with its ideology of Aryan superiority and the division of people into superior and inferior races.

It should also be taken into account that in the EU the leading role is played by the European People's Party, which unites conservative and Christian-democratic parties that gravitate towards neoliberal approaches in socio-economic policy. In the last elections to the European Parliament, the Party of European Socialists (PES) was in second place, and only the liberal Alliance for Freedom and Democracy was in third place.

Turning to traditional values in the chapter “The Struggle for Tradition: A New Form of Political Legitimization,” A. Shchipkov shows that their defense can be both fair and deeply reactionary in nature. “In fact, right-wing and left-wing traditionalism are mutually exclusive.” The first strives for “neopaganism - a “new Middle Ages” without Christianity,” and the second dreams of restoring the rights of the “Christian ethical layer of the European tradition.” The book criticizes the ideas of the conservative philosopher Alexander Dugin and his interpretation of the complex of ideas of domestic traditionalism, as well as the archaic views of right-wing conservatives speaking under the slogans of restoration of the pre-revolutionary monarchy.

Shchipkov raises the pressing question of the possibility of synthesizing the socialist idea and traditionalism, bringing socialists and supporters of traditional values closer together. Being an adherent of the ideas of left-wing traditionalism, the author naturally turns to the heritage of Russian Slavophiles, Narodniks and Socialist Revolutionaries, Christian socialists. For adherents of traditional values, there is only one way - to the left, believes A. Shchipkov and advocates a synthesis of Christian, humanistic and socialist ideals.

At the end of the book, A. Shchipkov makes an important conclusion, which seems to sum up all his thoughts. “To get out of the crisis, the world system will have to rebuild, change its ideological component. But it is no longer possible to do this within the framework of “classical liberalism.” Therefore, there is a real threat and temptation of the transition of transnational capital, which the author calls “dispatchers of the system,” to archaic and repressive forms of government. And it’s hard to disagree with this assessment.

Boris Romanov

church positions

Since 2007, executive secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Imperial Peter and Paul Cathedral in St. Petersburg.

October 23, 2014 - member of the Inter-Council Presence[6]; Secretary of the Commission for Information Activities of the Church and Relations with the Media.

On December 31, 2015, Patriarch Kirill appointed him acting first deputy chairman of the synodal Department for Relations of the Church with Society and the Media. His responsibilities include issues of interaction with government authorities and non-governmental organizations[7].

social Christianity

In 2021, he announced the possible canonization of Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky):

I am deeply convinced that he will be canonized. Not today, but in 5, 10, 50 years, there will inevitably be an awareness of the true scale of his personality and the colossal role he played in the history of the Russian Church”[10].

about the meeting in Havana

The topic of the relationship between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, their similarities and differences, to be honest, is of little relevance today. The meeting in Havana was not religious, but diplomatic. And in this regard, its significance is enormous. I will speak carefully. Let's just say that such meetings are very disturbing to those who are trying to start the Third World War for the sake of their own self-interest and redrawing the world map[11].

press

Author of the magazine “Friendship of Peoples”, “St. Petersburg Gazette”, the magazine “Smena”, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, “Literary Gazette”, “New Time”, as well as for “Questions of Philosophy” and other scientific publications[12]. At the same time, until 1992, he worked as a welder, galvanist, mechanic, and driver at enterprises in Leningrad.

From 1991 to 1992 - literary editor of the newspaper "Rating" (St. Petersburg), then - editor of the Christian Information Agency.

In 1994 he became a columnist for the St. Petersburg newspaper Smena.

From 1995, over the next seven years, he worked as editor of the program “What Russia Believes” on Radio Russia (VGTRK).

In 2000, he was elected deputy chairman of the Methodological Council for Covering Religious Issues in the Media at the Ministry of Transport and Industry.

Since 2001, he became chairman of the Guild of Religious Journalism. At the same time, he began working as the director of regional projects at MediaSoyuz and remained in this position for two years.

Since 2002 - editor-in-chief of the Internet portal “Religion and Media” (https://www.religare.ru).

Since 2004 - Executive Director; until 2006, he combined this position with the post of editor-in-chief of the New Politics website. At the same time, he acted as editor-in-chief of the Peoples of Russia website and was the host of programs at the Mayak radio station.

Since 2007 - Chairman of the Club of Orthodox Journalists.

Initiator of the creation of the Public Council of the Russian Federation on Television.

By order of the Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation dated March 3, 2009 No. 61, he was approved as a member of the Expert Council for conducting state religious studies examination under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation[13]. From 2009 to 2015 - member of the Expert Council for the State Religious Studies Examination.

Since 2012 - member of the Council of Public Television of Russia (OTR).

amoralism

Consistently glorifies suicide:

The problem was that General Efremov committed suicide; he shot himself while surrounded by enemies and without a chance to escape. The general could not have been captured!.. This is suicide in the performance of military duty, this is the highest of sacrifices - the sacrifice of one’s earthly life[14].

In 2011, he headed an initiative group that appealed to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' Kirill with a request to allow the church funeral of General M. G. Efremov. In September 2011, Patriarch Kirill gave permission for the funeral of Mikhail Efremov, noting in his resolution: “I agree with the need to revive the memory of the heroic struggle of General Mikhail Efremov and his loyalty to the Motherland and the brotherhood of soldiers.”[15]

Supporter of the canonization of Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky), who supposedly for him personifies the readiness to compromise with the anti-state for the sake of saving the Church:

We are unlikely to ever know what Patriarch Sergius was going through. But I am deeply convinced that he will be canonized. Sooner or later, not today, but in 5, 10, 50 years, there will inevitably be an awareness of the true scale of his personality and the colossal role he played in the history of the Russian Church[16].

Alexander Shchipkov: “We must move away from the liberal worldview”

Exclusive interview with the Deputy Head of the World Russian People's Council, political philosopher Alexander Shchipkov to the Tsargrad TV channel

The World Russian People's Council, one of the most significant international public organizations, has experienced major changes in 2021. Thus, in April of this year, the VRNS team was significantly updated: the founder of our channel, a famous Russian entrepreneur and public figure, Konstantin Malofeev, became the new deputy head of the Council, His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' Kirill. And already in October, at the XXIII World Russian People's Council, another deputy of its Head was elected - Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov Alexander Shchipkov.

* * *

Tsargrad : Alexander Vladimirovich, 2021 is not over yet, but many are already summing up its results. And the year is truly full of events, and not only positive ones. It began with the signing of the lawless “tomos” of “Ukrainian autocephaly” by Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, and subsequently the split in the Orthodox world only grew. But at the same time, we see the strengthening of Orthodoxy in Russia, as exemplified by significant changes in the World Russian People's Council, which is becoming a permanent center of church-public and church-state interaction. How significant do you think these changes will be in 2021?

Alexander Shchipkov : Time will tell what we are capable of and what the results will be, but you very accurately noted that the events that took place inside the World Russian People's Council can easily be ranked among the significant church-political events of 2019. I will note in passing that if the year began with the “Istanbul aggression”, it ended with the return of the Western European Archdiocese to the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church.

I would also put the structural and semantic changes associated with the World Russian People's Council in this category. And not because my colleagues honored me by choosing me as one of the Deputy Heads of the VRNS, but because the Council really began to change. What, first of all, has always been the Cathedral? It was a structure that united various Russian forces in Russia and on the territory of neighboring and even distant states. Over the 26 years of the existence of the ARNS, many useful things have been done and many important issues have been raised.

Today, another task has been added - to formulate a common conceptual platform. This does not mean that all Russian patriotic organizations should become the same. No. There must be a certain concept with which all those who stand on the traditionalist platform will agree.

Ts .: And indeed, we still don’t have this general concept...

A.V. Shchipkov. Photo courtesy of the press service of A. V. Shchipkov

A.Shch. : They often point out to us that our opponents from the liberal ecumene act coherently and clearly, they say, that’s how friendly they are. In fact, they are quite aggressive and hysterical, eating each other in competition. They hate each other, it's a ball of snakes. At the same time, they really work systematically, because they rely on a single ideological platform, the theses of which have been finely honed over three hundred years.

We traditionalists have our own set of fundamental values. This set is very clearly stated in the paradigm of religious language, but when “converted” to social language it fails. The traditionalist spectrum requires a new semantic arrangement. This process is not easy, it takes time. An important step towards this arrangement was made in January 2009 by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill literally a few days before his election to the Patriarchal ministry. He proposed to think about what universal values unite all Russian citizens.

We started talking about freedom, justice, patriotism, solidarity and so on. The search for value meanings has resulted in a heated and absolutely necessary discussion for our society. Values are not equal, they have their own hierarchy. Many people only realized this then. In the end, at one of the meetings held by the VRNS, His Holiness the Patriarch read out this list in his edition: faith came first.

Ts .: But for a believer this is obvious...

A.Shch. : Today - obviously. Today this has become the norm. And then it was not obvious. They argued and argued, and it did not occur to anyone what value should be put in first place, until the Patriarch uttered the word “faith.” It was this 2009 debate that began to change the landscape. At that time, many people could not even pronounce the word “value,” but now the phrase “traditional values” has become firmly established in our everyday life. And these are not just words - these are words that define the framework of the worldview of 140 million people living in Russia. Words that influence consciousness influence our social actions.

In this context, it is necessary to recall 1997 and the discussion around the preamble of the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” In those years, the appearance of a preamble mentioning the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and consolidating the concept of “traditional religions” was a real breakthrough, and this was also entirely the merit of Patriarch Kirill, at that time Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. Then, in general, the word “tradition” began to be uttered in the official political vocabulary for the first time. For the first time after a huge break, the concept of tradition began to slowly enter into political usage. Later, the concepts of “Russian world” and “Russian civilization” appeared. The first turning point was made in 1997, and the second in 2009.

Photo: Nikolay Gyngazov / Globallookpress

Ts .: A step towards that same universal traditionalist system, towards the concept that we have to develop?

A.Shch. : Exactly. In our country, relatively speaking, in the “traditionalist camp” it has not yet been established. It would seem that we understand everything, we often talk about the same things, but there is still no common system. Today we live in the era of the departure of liberalism: Francis Fukuyama has already renounced his texts of 30 years ago, but we cannot stand firmly on our feet, because we do not have this unified concept.

I believe that the “number one task” of the World Russian People’s Council is to take part in its formulation. Therefore, it is important to strengthen intellectual work. This is precisely what the committees we have been creating over the past year serve.

Ts .: Aren’t these committees a prototype of the “shadow government”?

A.Shch. : We don’t need to create something “shadowy”, we work openly. The VRNS is headed by His Holiness the Patriarch. Where the Church is located, there can be no “shadow”. It is all kinds of esotericists and gnostics who have “secret knowledge” and “degrees of initiation,” and in the Church there is the Truth of Christ. And the door to the Church is open to everyone. We are part of the Church and in our social activities we try to benefit people, the Church and the fatherland.

Our job is to help our traditionalist friends who work in a variety of fields: from theaters to scientific institutes. We rely on the historical resource of His Holiness the Patriarch. Whether we can use it correctly will depend on us.

His Holiness Patriarch Kirill. Photo: Pravda Komsomolskaya / Globallookpress

Ts .: But what does a “historical” resource mean?

A.Shch. : Firstly, a bishop who becomes the Russian Patriarch automatically becomes a historical figure, and he, realizing this, correlates his actions not only with the current agenda, but also with the historical one. Secondly, I have just shown, using the examples of 1997 and 2009, how the Patriarch can change the face of an era and influence the worldview of millions of people. This very historical resource allows him to do this.

Ts .: Nevertheless, the task of uniting Russian traditionalists of different directions, from Soviet patriotic socialists to right-wing monarchists, is very difficult. It is known that your monograph “Social Tradition” is dedicated to this. Can you tell us a little more about this experience?

A.Shch. : Over the past 15 years, I have been looking for different formulations of the convergence of social and traditionalist ideas. At first I didn’t even use the word “tradition”, using the term “conservatism”, I was looking for some “crutches” to help it. For example, “socialism”. We have a certain seventy years of experience of living under socialism. We built a social state, but as soon as we built it, it fell apart. Consequently, system errors were made. In my opinion, the main mistake is the rejection of the tradition associated with the Russian root identity.

The search was long. At first I came up with the phrase “left-wing conservatism.” But then I felt: no, that’s not it. It is very difficult to work with the concept of “left”, because if in Russia there are still worthy and decent bearers of the left idea, in the West they are completely dissolved by liberalism. This means that this term is no longer needed. “Conservatism” is also very different - sometimes nice, and sometimes not at all nice. By itself, it also cannot become a unifying platform - it is too amorphous. Eventually I began to use the term “traditionalism,” and to show the potential for combining traditionalism and social justice, I coined the term “social tradition.”

Traditional values cannot help but be associated with a social idea, because they come from morality, and relations within society based on a moral basis are social. This is the God-given norm of our life. Our task is to find a way to implement it politically.

Ts .: One of the key social norms given by God has always been the traditional large family. But at some point, completely insignificant within the framework of all human history, this mechanism began to work poorly. The last World Russian People's Council was dedicated to saving people - a task that must be solved as quickly as possible. But how can we make sure that the generation born in the nineties and zeros, mostly unchurched guys, understands the importance of creating families and having children? What should “click” in their minds?

Photo: KELENY / Shutterstock.com

A.Shch. : In order for modern boys and girls to “click” in their heads, we must move away from the liberal worldview. From the main liberal thought, which is that man is at the head of the universe. And God, even if he is not denied completely, is somewhere “on the side.” This is the main systemic thing, and until we change it, no money, no benefits will correct the situation. Of course, all this must be done: provide apartments, benefits, maternity capital... But the main thing must happen in the consciousness, it must become religious. Only then will that same traditional value scale turn on.

Only religious motivation, a religious outlook on life helps to reveal in a person - both men and women - those qualities that are now silent. First of all, love. It would seem such a simple thing, but in this liberal system, where there is no place for God, love in each of us is, as it were, underdeveloped and damaged. A woman has an abortion because she does not know how to love a man. After all, by killing the baby, she kills him too. Men allow abortions because they do not know how to truly love their woman, to see themselves in her, to feel her body as if it were their own, to feel her pain as if it were their own pain. This damaged consciousness can only be changed in one way - by restoring a religious worldview, by returning each of us to a religious coordinate system.

pathological speech

Alexander Shchipkov draws up his speeches using pathological speech, although he does not reach the level of confident proficiency in it.

techniques

Giving meaning.
Repetition
: “We must come to a general civil consensus, which can be based on only one thing - on a common attitude towards our history, so that we have a consensus in relation to it” [17].

stamps

Solidarity, conciliarity: “Solidarity is not the enemy of conciliarity. In both cases, life is assumed to be based on the principle “one for all, all for one.” This is Christian.”[18]

Rethinking (rethinking)[19].

Model
: “There are quite a few
interesting models
of state-church relations. In Russia there is no finally established system, but one can observe the emergence of elements of a contractual system, which successfully exists in a number of European countries”[20].

Integral
: “Conservatism... the most universal and integral ideology”[21].

Identity
;
Code
: “The condition for strengthening Russian identity is the synthesis or, in the language of semiotics, the mutual translation of different historical and cultural codes that make up the single symbolic space of the Russian tradition. In particular, Soviet values (code of “social justice”) and Christian values (gospel code)”[22].

Worldwide responsiveness
: All chapters of this book (Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Seven words about the Russian world / compiled by A.V. Shchipkov. M.: World Russian People's Council, 2015) are united by a sense of deep, indissoluble unity of the national spirit and principles justice, conciliarity, solidarity and “
worldwide responsiveness
” of apostolic Christianity[23].

Consensus

The next year is the year of ideology, during which we must come to a general civil consensus, which can be based on only one thing - on a common attitude towards our history, so that we have a consensus in relation to it[17].
The rule to be followed is that no part of society can speak on behalf of the whole society. Only on this basis are consensus
and interaction possible. Problems are inevitable in any society. But our task is to solve them, not provoke them[24].

myths

Gnostic creativity: “The Soviet period is also our history, it is not alien. And it consisted not only of nomenklatura decisions, but also of the sincere collective creativity of the people”[18].

pathological vocabulary

Information war, Collective memory, Collective consciousness, Collective experience, Model, Passionarity, Rethink, Politics, Political beliefs, Posthumanistic, Meaning, Conciliarity, Solidarity, Philosophical

"I didn't believe them"

Rosbalt continues to publish a series of interviews “Separated by Timelessness” with representatives of two generations – those who rose to fame in the nineties, and those who became famous in the tenth.

Coming from the nineties: Alexander Shchipkov

Today Alexander Shchipkov is an active and bright religious-political ideologist and publicist of a protective nature, very close to both the clergy and the secular authorities. His position on almost all points is close to the official one. But his road to this was not ordinary.

Having come to faith as a teenager, Alexander Shchipkov led the life of an Orthodox activist rejected by the Soviet system for a decade and a half. His mother Tatyana Shchipkova, a teacher at a Smolensk university, served time for organizing an underground religious seminar. He himself made the classic “career” of a man from the Leningrad underground: he was a loader and fireman.

In the stoker room of the hospital named after. Kuibyshev, Leningrad, 1987. Photo from the personal archive of Alexander Shchipkov

A change in the political regime allowed Shchipkov to leave underground. From the beginning to the end of the 1990s, he worked “for about two years, engaged in scientific research, practical journalism, and the fight for the return of temples.”

But in the August days of 1991, he did not want to participate in the fight against the putschists, although he understood how many benefits Yeltsin’s victory would bring him.

— On August 19, 1991, I was in Moscow. I'm calling Gleb Yakunin. “Father Gleb, what’s going on? “Sasha, there’s no time for talking, drop everything, go to the White House.” Arrived at the White House. Early morning. Bustle. Has entered. Came out. Came in again, came out again. I was looking for friends. Have not found. And then the entrance was blocked. That's how interesting things are in life. If I had accidentally remained on the other side of the door, my life would probably have turned out differently. Because I would look at this world from the window of the White House. And I was very lucky. I still remained with my people - “where my people, unfortunately, were.”

And all these three days I was in the state of an enchanted wanderer. I understood that tectonic events were taking place. But I couldn’t contain it. There was a feeling that I didn’t want to participate in this, there was no desire to be a hunter and finish off this huge wounded beast - despite the fact that I personally, as a “declassed element,” received nothing but benefits from Yeltsin’s victory. After all, the very first thought on August 19, when they woke me up and told me about the coup, was: “Oh God, back to the stoking room again!...”.

“You couldn’t join the people who defended your cause?”

- No, it was not my business. I didn't believe them. Well, communists. Well, they repainted it. Because the communists always lied. Because the communists persecuted us, Orthodox Christians. And believe the communists...

-...But you trust Putin, right? He was also a communist. Well, also an employee of the authorities, if this additionally suits you.

- You are trying to superimpose today's political situation on those days. But there can be no direct correlation here. I look at the current state of Russia differently. The country is different, and I am different. And then they reasoned: it’s not mine, I’m one of the dissidents, from the underground. Being in power was considered indecent.

At home on the Griboyedov Canal, Leningrad, 1980s. Photo from the personal archive of Alexander Shchipkov

— When did you overcome the underground person syndrome?

— In the early 90s, I was offered to get involved in politics, go to elections, and with my “anti-Soviet” biography, I would have easily won them in those years. But I refused - I was disdainful. I would do things differently now. If you don’t do it yourself, others will decide for you. And I continued to work in the firehouse back in 1992. My replacement Mitya Shagin (artist, founder of the Mitki group - ed.) and many of my stoker friends came out of the underground much earlier. Psychologically, after 15 years of working on a “work grid,” the most difficult thing for me was to tell myself: I am no longer a fireman. And take the risk of starting life all over again at 35 years old. In the mid-90s, I came to the St. Petersburg newspaper Smena as a religious observer.

— Was it difficult for you there?

“I was a little embarrassed by the uninhibited youth, but they didn’t even ask me why I didn’t have a higher education diploma. In a secular newspaper I created an entire page on religious and political topics. This was a breakthrough in religious journalism.

— That is, a secular and, as far as I remember, liberal newspaper, seeing that you were offering interesting materials, willingly published them. Nothing stopped you from doing your job. Were you really repulsed by the spirit of freedom at that time?

— There were no illiberal newspapers then. And even today there are no more of them than there are fingers on one hand. I approached it pragmatically: if this freedom is not for long, then I need to have time to do as much as possible. I had already lived the first half of my life, I didn’t have time, and I worked for two years. I was engaged in scientific research, practical journalism, and the fight for the return of temples. The Lord came to meet me halfway. I felt comfortable at Smena, and then even more comfortable at St. Petersburg Radio and Radio Russia.

— It turns out that it’s not about specific media, but about the spirit of that time.

- Nothing like this. It's about specific people who were my bosses. They gave me a lot of freedom. If they hadn’t given it, I would have turned around and left immediately. Not out of pride, I just didn't have time. I experimented a lot and I think that they themselves were interested in what I was doing.

In 1991, Yeltsin announced that the state would return all the churches to us. In St. Petersburg at that time there were only 6 operating churches. We began to create parish councils and petition for the return of buildings. But Sobchak resisted with such force... For some political reasons, which ultimately were, of course, anti-clerical. Each temple was fought. Signature collections, rallies, unauthorized prayer services...

- Or maybe this is how it should be? If people need a temple, then they must make some effort to evict various institutions, museums, etc. from the building. It seems to me that they respect only the right that they defend. If a temple building is simply taken and granted by the mayor, then the mayor can take it away at any time.

“We should have made efforts to raise funds, repairs, restoration, but we had to spend our energy on political methods and squeeze out of Smolny what Yeltsin promised in the Kremlin. Let me draw your attention to the fact that the law on the return of church property was adopted only at the end of 2010. Why was it not adopted immediately in 1991? Why did they wait 19 years? No answer…

- But is it possible, looking from today, to seriously call this time the years of oppression of the Russian Orthodox Church, non-recognition of its natural role? Or perhaps the Russian Orthodox Church is laying claim to a role that not everyone considers natural?

— In St. Petersburg, of course, there was political pressure on the Church from Sobchak, who tried to create a special Interreligious Council headed by a secular official. And he was very angry with Metropolitan John (Snychev), who upset this cunning project. I once talked to Sobchak about God. I called his press service and said: “Can I do an interview? - What about the topic? “About God.” A week later I received an invitation.

- Evaluate this agreement. A person is not obliged to talk about his faith. The mayor voluntarily agreed to talk about things that were apparently difficult for him.

“The first question I asked was whether he believed in God, and he answered in the affirmative.” It was a difficult conversation. I got the feeling that he had deep and insoluble problems inside. He looked very confused. After some time, I understood why he agreed to accept me. He had no one to talk to about these topics; he wanted to understand himself.

But such a conversation is possible either with a priest or with someone very close who loves you, who is ready to accept your pain, your doubts, your weakness. And Sobchak agreed to a meeting with a complete stranger. And this is his loneliness... I saw that a person needs a deep confession. But I was completely unprepared for this role, I didn’t want it, and I didn’t have the right to it. And I turned the conversation to political topics.

— Don’t you think that in the “damned 90s” religious and church life developed in a much more natural order? The head of the city talked with an Orthodox activist about faith. One way or another, the temples were returned. And I didn’t see any anti-clerical sentiments then. And now I see it. Until recently, progressive people were not anticlerical. Today they are anticlerical, even if they define themselves as Orthodox. Atheism, which seemed to have completely disappeared from the scene, was revived. Among young educated people there are many demonstrative atheists. Isn’t this the result of the nationalization of the Russian Orthodox Church and the protective attitudes of its hierarchy?

— By the will of history, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Church turned out to be a fellow traveler for democratic forces in the fight against communism. And it was not accepted to criticize the Church in the media. Because that was the position of the ruling political circles. And in 2011, this unofficial taboo was lifted. And this fact was a direct reflection of the struggle of the political elites.

- Or maybe everything can be explained more simply? Anti-clerical sentiments grow out of quite visible things. From the hunt for “those who offend feelings.” From show trials. From cruel punishments. The Pussy Riot case has become a textbook case, but the number of punitive cases continues to increase.

“These dancers are just someone else’s tools.” They have been used and will continue to be used for some time. And there is still no answer to the question of who benefited from planting them. The answer is in the archives, and we will not find out about it soon. But obviously not Putin. Personally, I did not advocate for them to be imprisoned for a real term...

— You could advocate not to imprison...

- No, I'm sorry. This is for the court. They are the attacking party, and the church is the injured party. There is such a proven ideological trick - swapping places between the victim and the attacker. What did the textbooks on scientific atheism say in the 70s? That the Church itself is to blame for the mass repressions of the twenties, since by 1917, they say, it had become so “grown together” and so “decayed” that it caused disgust and disgust among the people. And thereby provoked shootings and executions. The anti-clerical girls who burst into the temple were declared victims, and those against whom their aggression was directed were found guilty.

Anticlericalism was, is and will be. It either subsides or intensifies throughout Christian history. Compare with the Holocaust. The Nazis said that the Jews themselves were to blame for their extermination. They were killed in countless numbers, and they are also to blame. Why? Because they have a lot of money, hysterical music and unpleasant sidelocks. And Orthodox priests drive Mercedes, sing in nasal voices and do not wash their shaggy hair. It's the same thing. This approach is devoid of logic. But, alas, he is not without hatred.

— You are a strong polemicist. But isn’t the attack on various spheres that the Russian Orthodox Church is undertaking, and not in a natural way, but constantly calling on the authorities for help, especially material, with constant requests to punish some new offenders – doesn’t merging with the state lead to isolation? church hierarchy?

- And this merging is not an axiom at all. This is an element of information warfare. It's not even close. In the media space, a phantom of the clericalization of the state is created, a meme that is launched and affects society.

Clericalization is the ability of a religious organization to influence the state's political decision-making. But there is nothing like this under Putin, there was nothing like it under Yeltsin, and even under the Romanovs, the attitude towards whom in the Orthodox community is far from unambiguous. In Russian history, the Church has never been allowed by the state to make political decisions. But let us note that she was always called upon for help in moments of grave danger.

Patriarch Kirill and Alexander Shchipkov at the opening of the memorial plaque to Tatyana Shchipkova, Smolensk, 2012. Photo from the personal archive of Alexander Shchipkov

— Now the idea of a symphony and church-state cooperation is being popularized.

- The word is good, and for the church ear it is familiar and dear. But each era must still put its own meanings into it. And our symphony is possible only in one case - if both the Church and the state understand that these two parties can do something together in partnership. But not in a merger.

- Then this apparently implies a symphony with the Muslim clergy. Can there be two symphonies?

- They can. A polysymphony is an ordinary concordat system. It exists in different countries. When the state and large religious organizations enter into agreements and stipulate in them the rights and obligations of the parties. It is impossible to introduce such a system right away. We in Russia are slowly moving in this direction. Agreements are concluded between the Church and, say, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense. It's the same for Muslims. In some regions, Protestants also enter into such agreements.

At first, in the 90s, when I wrote about the concordat system, many Orthodox Christians took it with hostility. They were afraid that this could result in an analogue of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Soviet era.

- Certainly.

- Of course not. Because the Council for Religious Affairs is a government body that sets its own rules of conduct for religious organizations. A concordat is an agreement between two equal parties. It helps in solving many technical problems. You have no idea, for example, how difficult it is to send a huge number of believers to Hajj. This is related to the safety of citizens, visas, coordination of mandatory vaccinations, etc. It is impossible to do without the participation of the state.

— Situations like this are understandable. People usually talk about other cases with fear.

— There is a liberal point of view that religious organizations should be separated from the state by a blank wall. But this is unrealistic. The state exists for all of us, it is obliged to resolve any disputes, it must consult with specialists who are familiar with the problems.

- Through your lips. Because in circles of people, not exactly anti-clerical, but let’s say, non-church people, the idea is very popular that the church hierarchy is something like a department of the Kremlin administration.

— Another ideologeme, another meme. But in fact, I’ll say it as a knowledgeable person. Mutual misunderstanding - I use the mildest word - arises between representatives of the Church and representatives of the state quite often.

— The Russian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical structure by definition. With its own vertical. Is it compatible with political democracy?

— The Church is compatible with democracy, and with monarchy, and with any other structure, because faith itself, its main meaning is communication with God and the question of salvation, the question of death and eternal life. Everything else is essential, but secondary. And the question of saving a person for eternal life has nothing to do with the political structure of the state.

— What are your political beliefs?

— For some reason, it is believed that all Orthodox Christians are monarchists. This is wrong. As for political labels, the terms “democrat” or “patriot” do not explain anything. My political position is social conservatism. I think that in Russia it is necessary to combine the leftist idea with the conservative one. I am a person of leftist views in economics, I am for a social state. And I am a conservative in the moral sphere - traditional family, traditional culture, traditional religion.

-Are you an anti-liberal?

- Yes. When I write articles in which I explain my left-conservative position, I inevitably oppose the liberals. Because it's the opposite way of thinking. The social state is the opposite of the market state - with its total competition and ideology of survival of the fittest. This is contrary to the Christian understanding of human relationships. But a social state devoid of religious morality (as it was in the USSR) does not suit me either. I'm a conservative here.

The concept of “freedom” for me has nothing to do with liberalism. Freedom is the inner state of a person.

With Sergei Mironov. Photo from the personal archive of Alexander Shchipkov

The bearers of liberalism as an ideology in Russia for the last hundred years have been intellectuals. I recently published an article “The Death of the Intelligentsia”, which caused many grievances among my friends and acquaintances. The intelligentsia in Russia has always claimed a monopoly on freedom. I believe that the intelligentsia in the 90s betrayed their ideals of non-covetousness and free-thinking and disappeared. Together with it, Russian liberalism in the form that was established after 1945 is disappearing before our eyes.

When you are engaged in political and religious-political journalism, you often have to formulate ideas, sharpening them a little. Otherwise they won't understand you. And this, of course, causes an aggravated reaction. Although in relationships with people I strive to clearly separate the worldview and the personal. And I always mourn when political and ideological things become an insurmountable obstacle for people in personal communication.

-What would you say to educated youth who practice atheism?

“I would tell them, firstly, that in establishing their worldview they should try not to be aggressive towards another worldview.

Secondly, as a person who came to faith at a young age, but still not from infancy, I was 16 years old, I can say that faith is an absolutely irrational thing. It is impossible to force a person to believe. But in the life of everyone - without exception - there is a situation when God reveals this secret to him. Not for any merit or sacrifice, but just like that - free of charge, as a gift. But, as a rule, we do not notice this first gift and refuse it. You suddenly realize that God exists, but you closed your eyes, turned away and walked away from it. Because it is a very big load. I remember from myself. When this feeling came to me, the first thing I had was a feeling of fear: I had learned something that I could not ignore for the rest of my life. And this happens to everyone.

And, addressing these guys, I would advise them to be very attentive to themselves. Including when they defend their atheism, the very name of which already contains the word God. Atheism is antitheism. You formulate your views starting from God, which means relying on Him. He is already present in your life.

“We’re talking to you about sublime things, and I see a person who has experienced and thought through a lot, who has something to say to others. We talk about the topic of the day - and I see a guardian, and a rather merciless one. I don't even pretend to understand you.

— Two people may not understand each other when discussing ideological subjects and related political conclusions. They may seem to be on different worldview planes. This encourages controversy, but it is not at all tragic. It is tragic when two people discuss sublime things and suddenly find themselves on different moral planes. Then they are doomed to eternal mutual misunderstanding, to eternal error.

Interviewed by Sergei Shelin

awards

Gratitude from the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation “For impeccable federal public service” (2011).

Awarded the Order of the Russian Orthodox Church: Daniel of Moscow, 3rd degree (2007); Sergius of Radonezh 3rd degree (2013); medal “In memory of the 1000th anniversary of the repose of Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Duke Vladimir” (2015).

Laureate of the Union of Journalists of Russia “Golden Pen of Russia” award (nomination “Best Radio Program”) for 1997. Laureate of the festival “Faith and Word” (nomination “for personal contribution to the development of Orthodox media”) for 2010. Winner of the Moscow magazine literary prize (Publicism category) for 2013. Laureate of the National Award “Best Books and Publishing Houses” (nomination “Religion, Philosophy”) for 2015. Winner of the Golden Delvig literary award (for the book “The Bronze Age of Russia. View from Tarusa”) for 2015.

By decision of the City Duma of the State Enterprise “City of Tarusa” No. 12 dated May 21, 2015, “for special services to the city of Tarusa and invaluable contribution to the creation of the historical image of the city” (installation of monuments to Ivan Tsvetaev, General Mikhail Efremov, Nikolai Zabolotsky) he was awarded the title of honorary citizen of Tarusa.

essays

thesis

Shchipkov, A.V.
Christian-democratic movements in post-Soviet Russia: dissertation ... candidate of philosophical sciences: 09.00.11. / Ross. acad. Sci. Institute of Philosophy. - Moscow, 2000. - 170 p. (Social philosophy)

books

Shchipkov A.V.
What Russia believes in. Religious processes in post-perestroika Russia. Lecture course. - St. Petersburg: RKhGI, 1998. - 297 p. — ISBN 5-888-031-6. (copy) Reviewers: Doctor of Philosophy, Professor Yu. N. Solonin, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University, Candidate of Philosophy V. V. Arzhanukhin, Head of the Department of Religious Studies of the Russian State Pedagogical University named after. A. N. Herzen. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Cathedral Courtyard: Publicist. Art.: 1991—2001 / Preface. L. N. Mitrokhina. - M.: Media Union, 2003. - 319 p. — ISBN 5-901-683-64-1. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Christian democracy in Russia = Christliche demokratie in Russland. - M.: Klyuch - S, 2004. - 119 p. — (Library “New Politics”). — ISBN 5-93136-029-3. (copy) – Access date: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Territory of the Church. - M.: INDRIK, 2012. - 176 p. — ISBN 978-5-91674-220-6. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Fracture. Collection of articles on the justice of tradition. - M.: Probel-2000, 2013. - 176 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-382-1. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Religious dimension of journalism. - M.: PROBEL-2000, 2014. - 272 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-436-1. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Traditionalism, liberalism and neo-Nazism in the space of current politics. - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2015. - 80 p. — ISBN 978-5-9905927-1-1. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
National history as a social contract: from economic hegemonism to a consensus of traditions. - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2015. - 88 p. — ISBN 978-5-906792-00-6. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Bronze Age of Russia. View from Tarusa. - St. Petersburg: Russian Culture, 2015. - 192 p. — ISBN 978-5-905618-08-6.
Shchipkov A.V.
Block. 1917 – 2021: Collection of articles on Russian identity. - M.: Probel-2000, 2015. - 216 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-506-1.
Shchipkov A.V.
Dialectics of economic and religious-ethical in the formation of Russian social-traditionalism. - M.: Probel-2000, 2015. - 204 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-493-4.
Shchipkov AV
Traditionalism, Liberalism and Neo-Nazism in the Current Political Space. - M., 2021. - 76 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-551-1.
Shchipkov A.V.
Before and after politics. - M.: Probel-2000, 2021. - 132 p. — ISBN 978-5-5-98604-537-3.

compiler

Petersburg paganism. Collection of articles / Shchipkov A. V. (editor and compiler). - St. Petersburg: Apostolic City - Nevskaya Perspective, 1999. - 98 p. — ISBN 5-93112-005-X. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Annushkin V.I., Chistyakova I.Yu., Tarasov M.I., Kabankova Yu.Yu.
Rhetoric of the Patriarch. To the 70th anniversary of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' / Comp. A. V. Shchipkov. - M.: Russistics, 2021. - 256 p. — ISBN 978-5-7805-1201-1.

articles

Shchipkov A.V.
On the causes of the crisis of Russian identity // Literary newspaper. — 2021. — February 04. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Be careful: Roskomreligiya! // Religion and democracy. — M.: Progress. - 1993. - 133-140 p.
Shchipkov A.V.
Christian democracy in Russia. // Religion and politics in post-communist Russia - M.: Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1994. - P. 119-186
Shchipkov A. V.
“Orthodoxy and Russian Christian Democracy.” // Ideology in Russia - St. Petersburg, 1995. - pp. 27-30.
Shchipkov A.V.
Moon Sect. // Modern sects in Russia - M.-SPb., 1995. - P. 61-67.
Shchipkov A.V.
“Market” Russia and the effect of religious entropy. // Church and state in the Russian Orthodox and Western Latin traditions - St. Petersburg - 1996. - pp. 141-152.
Shchipkov A. V.
“Market life and religious consciousness.” // Philosophy in the world of knowledge, technology and faith - St. Petersburg - 1997. Volume V, pp. 474-476
Shchipkov A.V.
Religious journalism is expert journalism. // State, media and Church Materials and recommendations of the scientific-practical conference (November 14, 2001). - M., 2001. P. 9−14
Shchipkov A.V.
Religion and politics in post-communist Russia (materials of the round table). // Questions of philosophy. - 1992. - No. 7. - P.16-22.
Shchipkov A.V.
Cross on a deputy mandate. // Russian thought. - 1993. - November 25, No. 4006. (Christian Bulletin. - 1993. - No. 45/46. - P.22-25)
Shchipkov A.V.
“Saint” Moon needs Gorbachev. // New time. - 1994. - No. 13. - P.42-44.
Shchipkov A.V.
Political inversions of religious consciousness // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. - 1993. - December 09. (Christian Bulletin. - 1994. - No. 1. - P. 33-37). – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Church of Ingria. Russian version of Finnish Lutheranism. // Truth and life. - 1996. - No. 11. - P. 6-9. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Is a concordat between the Eastern Christian Churches and the state possible? // New Europe. - 2002. - No. 15. - P.110-116. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Department of Cults. The restructuring of church-state relations is overdue. // Independent newspaper. - 2002. - April 5. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Lukashenko and churches. Religious and political situation in Belarus. // Russian thought. - 2002. - April 9. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
The state and the Church must agree. // Political magazine. - 2007. - December 18. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
“Don’t feed Russians bread - let them talk about God.” // Orthodoxy and modernity. - 2008. - March 7.
Shchipkov A.V.
Exhumation of fascism. // News. — 2015. — April 6. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
An intellectual cannot be a liberal // Literary newspaper. — 2014. — December 17. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
National history as a social contract. // Free Press. — 2014. — December 21. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
A country where gentlemen look for oil // Literary newspaper. — 2013. — August 27. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Necessary social therapy // Izvestia. — 2014. — August 04. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Back to Zabolotsky! // Arguments and Facts. — 2014. — March 27. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Chimeras of “collective guilt” // Literary newspaper. — 2014. — February 05. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Multiculturalism for the great powers // Literary newspaper, December 25, 2013 – Date of access: 07/07/2017.
Shchipkov A.V.
Christianophobia as a political project // Literary newspaper. — 2013. — December 04. – Date of access: 07/07/2017.

in other languages

Shchipkov Aleksandr.
Attemps to revive the council for Religious Affairs in Russia. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1993, vol. 21, 3-4.
Chipkov Alexandr
. Red? Brownshirts? Or Whites after all // Bulletin of Christian Democratic International - Belgique - Brussels - 1992, 18.
Chipkov Alexandr
. "Adieu Leningrad!" // Bulletin of Christian Democratic International - Belgique - Brussels - 1991, 15
Shchipkov Aleksandr
. Some Observations on Orthoxy and Christian Democracy. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1994, vol. 22, 3.
Shchipkov Aleksandr and Sergei Filatov
. Religious Developments among the Volga Nations as a Model for the Russian Federation. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1995, vol. 23, 3.
Scipkov Aleksandr
. Die Etappen eines grosen Weges. // Religion und Gesellschaft im postsowjetischen Raum - Wurzburg - 1996. pp. 38-51
Stschipkov Alexander
. Die Baschowzy - eine neuheidnische Bevegung. // Glaube in der 2. Welt - Schweiz - 1997, 2
Shchipkov Aleksandr and Sergei Filatov
. Udmurtia: Ornhodoxy, Paganism, Authority. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1997, vol. 25, 2
Shchipkov Aleksandr
. Orthodoxy in Karelia. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1997, vol. 25, 2
Shchipkov Aleksandr
. Interreligious Relations in Russia after 1917 / Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia. - New York: ORBIS BOOKS. — 1999. P. 77-92
Shchipkov Aleksandr
. Rumors of KGB past may help metropolitan win power truggle. // Keston News Service, 05.25.99
Shchipkov Oleksandr
. Church dormitories see the problems of government regulation. // Lyudina I suite - Kiev - 2000, No. 9
Shchipkov Aleksandr, Fagan Geraldin
. Anti-missijnery Legislation in Belgorod. // Frontier - England - Oxford - 2001. No. 4
Chipkov Alexandre
. Orthodoxie Russi: Le debate sur les relations entre l'eglise orthodoxe et l'etat. // Unite des chretiens, No. 123, juillet 2001

Dossier

Alexander Vladimirovich Shchipkov was born on August 3, 1957 in Leningrad, but then the family moved to Smolensk.

In 1973, he met the rector of the Church of the Great Martyr Nikita in the village of Kabanovo, Orekhovo-Zuevsky district, Moscow region - Archpriest Dimitry Dudko, which determined his future life choice.

Together with his mother and wife, he took part in the activities of a Christian seminar organized on the initiative of Alexander Ogorodnikov in the first half of the seventies. Published in the samizdat magazine “Community,” which was published by the spiritual children of Dmitry Dudko, participants in the seminar in 1976-77. In 1978, he was struck down in social rights and expelled from the Smolensk Pedagogical Institute (Faculty of Foreign Languages) from the fifth year with the wording: “for behavior incompatible with the title of a Soviet student.”

In 1978-1980 he served in military service in Central Asia in the Turkestan Military District. In the late 80s he began to engage in journalistic, scientific and teaching activities. He wrote for Friendship of Peoples, St. Petersburg Vedomosti, Smena, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Novoye Vremya, as well as for Questions of Philosophy and other scientific publications. At the same time, until 1992, he worked as a welder, galvanist, mechanic, and driver at enterprises in Leningrad. From 1991 to 1992 - literary editor of the newspaper "Rating" (St. Petersburg), then - editor of the Christian Information Agency.

In 1994, he received permission to complete his education, interrupted in 1978. At the same time he became a columnist for the St. Petersburg newspaper Smena.

From 1995, over the next seven years, he worked as editor of the program “What Russia Believes” on Radio Russia (VGTRK).

From 1998 to 1999 he taught at the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University.

In 2000, under the scientific supervision of Academician L.N. Mitrokhin defended his candidate’s thesis at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the specialty “social philosophy” on the topic “Christian Democratic movements in post-Soviet Russia.” At the same time, he was elected deputy chairman of the Methodological Council for Covering Religious Issues in the Media at the Ministry of Transport and Industry.

Since 2001, he became chairman of the Guild of Religious Journalism. At the same time, he began working as the director of regional projects at MediaSoyuz and remained in this position for two years. Since 2002 - editor-in-chief of the Internet portal "Religion and Media".

Since 2007 - Chairman of the Club of Orthodox Journalists, as well as executive secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Imperial Peter and Paul Cathedral of St. Petersburg. Author of the books “What Russia Believes” (1998), “Cathedral Court” (2002), “Christian Democracy in Russia” (2004).

Assistant to the Chairman of the Federation Council (until 2011).

Initiator of the creation of the Public Council of the Russian Federation on Television.

By order of the Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation dated March 3, 2009 No. 61, he was approved as a member of the Expert Council for conducting state religious studies examination under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.[12] From 2009 to 2015 - member of the Expert Council for the State Religious Studies Examination. Since 2012 - member of the Council of Public Television of Russia (OTR)

October 23, 2014 - member of the Inter-Council Presence of the Russian Orthodox Church MP[13]; Secretary of the Commission for Information Activities of the Church and Relations with the Media. Acting State Councilor 3rd class. Awarded the Order of the Russian Orthodox Church: Daniel of Moscow, 3rd degree (2007); Sergius of Radonezh 3rd degree (2013); medal “In memory of the 1000th anniversary of the repose of Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Duke Vladimir” (2015).

Laureate of the Union of Journalists of Russia “Golden Pen of Russia” award (nomination “Best Radio Program”) for 1997. Winner of the Moscow magazine literary prize (Publicism category) for 2013. By decision of the City Duma “City of Tarusa” No. 12 dated May 21, 2015, “for special services to the city of Tarusa and invaluable contribution to the creation of the historical image of the city” (installation of monuments to Ivan Tsvetaev, General Mikhail Efremov, Nikolai Zabolotsky) he was awarded the title of honorary citizen of Tarusa.

Family

Married, father of four children.

Dissertations

Shchipkov, A.V. Christian-democratic movements in post-Soviet Russia: dissertation ... candidate of philosophical sciences: 09.00.11. / Ross. acad. Sci. Institute of Philosophy. - Moscow, 2000. - 170 p. (Social philosophy)

Books

Shchipkov A.V. (editor and compiler). Petersburg paganism. Digest of articles. - St. Petersburg: Apostolsky Gorod, 1999. - 98 p. — ISBN 5-93112-005-X. Shchipkov A.V. What Russia believes in. Religious processes in post-perestroika Russia. Lecture course. - St. Petersburg: RKhGI, 1998. - 297 p. — ISBN 5-888-031-6. (copy) Reviewers: Doctor of Philosophy, Professor Yu. N. Solonin, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University, Candidate of Philosophy V. V. Arzhanukhin, Head of the Department of Religious Studies of the Russian State Pedagogical University named after. A. N. Herzen Shchipkov A. V. Cathedral Courtyard: Publicist. Art.: 1991—2001 / Preface. L. N. Mitrokhina. - M.: Media Union, 2003. - 319 p. — ISBN 5-901-683-64-1. Shchipkov A.V. Christian democracy in Russia = Christliche demokratie in Russland. - M.: Klyuch - S, 2004. - 119 p. — (Library “New Politics”). — ISBN 5-93136-029-3. (copy) Shchipkov A.V. Territory of the Church. - M.: INDRIK, 2012. - 176 p. — ISBN 978-5-91674-220-6. Shchipkov A.V. Fracture. Collection of articles on the justice of tradition. - M.: Probel-2000, 2013. - 176 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-382-1. Shchipkov A.V. Religious dimension of journalism. - M.: PROBEL-2000, 2014. - 272 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-436-1. Shchipkov A.V. Traditionalism, liberalism and neo-Nazism in the space of current politics. - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2015. - 80 p. — ISBN 978-5-9905927-1-1. Shchipkov A.V. National history as a social contract: from economic hegemonism to a consensus of traditions. - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2015. - 88 p. — ISBN 978-5-906792-00-6. Shchipkov A.V. Bronze Age of Russia. View from Tarusa. - St. Petersburg: Russian Culture, 2015. - 192 p. — ISBN 978-5-905618-08-6. Shchipkov A.V. Block. 1917 – 2021: Collection of articles on Russian identity. - M.: Probel-2000, 2015. - 216 p. — ISBN 978-5-98604-506-1.

Articles

In Russian: · Shchipkov A. V. Be careful: Roskomreligiya! // Religion and democracy. - M.: Progress. - 1993. - 133-140 p. · Shchipkov A.V. Christian democracy in Russia. // Religion and politics in post-communist Russia - M.: Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1994. - pp. 119-186 · Shchipkov A. V. “Orthodoxy and Russian Christian Democracy.” // Ideology in Russia - St. Petersburg, 1995. - pp. 27-30. · Shchipkov A.V. Moon Sect. // Modern sects in Russia - M.-SPb., 1995. - P. 61-67. · Shchipkov A.V. “Market” Russia and the effect of religious entropy. // Church and state in the Russian Orthodox and Western Latin traditions - St. Petersburg - 1996. - pp. 141-152. · Shchipkov A.V. “Market life and religious consciousness.” // Philosophy in the world of knowledge, technology and faith - St. Petersburg - 1997. Volume V, pp. 474-476 · Shchipkov A. V. Religious journalism is expert journalism. // State, media and Church Materials and recommendations of the scientific-practical conference (November 14, 2001). - M., 2001. P. 9−14 Shchipkov A.V. Religion and politics in post-communist Russia (round table materials). // Questions of philosophy. - 1992. - No. 7. - P.16-22 · Shchipkov A.V. Cross on a deputy mandate. // Russian thought. No. 4006. 11/25/1993 (Christian Bulletin. - 1993. - No. 45/46. - P.22-25) · Shchipkov A.V. “Holy” Moon needs Gorbachev. // New time. - 1994. - No. 13. - P.42-44 Shchipkov A.V. Political inversions of religious consciousness // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 12/09/1993 (Christian Bulletin. - 1994. - No. 1. - P.33-37) · Shchipkov A.V. Church of Ingria. Russian version of Finnish Lutheranism. // Truth and life. - 1996. - No. 11. - P. 6-9 · Shchipkov A.V. Is a concordat of Eastern Christian Churches with the state possible? // New Europe. - 2002. - No. 15. - P.110-116 · Shchipkov A.V. Department of Cults. The restructuring of church-state relations is overdue. // Independent newspaper. — 2002, April 5 · Shchipkov A.V. Lukashenko and the church. Religious and political situation in Belarus. // Russian thought. — 2002, April 9 · Shchipkov A.V. The state and the Church must agree. // Political magazine. — 2007, December 18 · Shchipkov A.V. “Don’t feed Russians bread - let them talk about God.” // Orthodoxy and modernity. — 2008, March 7 · Shchipkov A.V. Exhumation of fascism. // Izvestia, April 6, 2015 · Shchipkov A. V. An intellectual cannot be a liberal // Literary newspaper, December 17, 2014 · Shchipkov A. V. National history as a social contract. // Free Press, December 21, 2014 · Shchipkov A. V. A country where gentlemen are looking for oil // Literary newspaper, August 27, 2013 · Shchipkov A. V. Necessary social therapy // Izvestia, August 04, 2014 · Shchipkov A.V. Back to Zabolotsky! // Arguments and Facts, March 27, 2014 · Shchipkov A. V. Chimeras of “collective guilt” // Literary newspaper, February 5, 2014 · Shchipkov A. V. Multiculturalism for the great powers // Literary newspaper, December 25, 2013 · Shchipkov A. V. Christianophobia as a political project // Literary newspaper, December 4, 2013

In other languages:

· Shchipkov Aleksandr. Attemps to revive the council for Religious Affairs in Russia. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1993, vol. 21, 3-4. · Chipkov Alexandr. Red? Brownshirts? Or Whites after all // Bulletin of Christian Democratic International - Belgique - Brussels - 1992, 18. Chipkov Alexandr. "Adieu Leningrad!" // Bulletin of Christian Democratic International - Belgique - Brussels - 1991, 15 Shchipkov Aleksandr. Some Observations on Orthoxy and Christian Democracy. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1994, vol. 22, 3. · Shchipkov Aleksandr and Sergei Filatov. Religious Developments among the Volga Nations as a Model for the Russian Federation. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1995, vol. 23, 3. · Scipkov Aleksandr. Die Etappen eines grosen Weges. // Religion und Gesellschaft im postsowjetischen Raum - Wurzburg - 1996. pp. 38-51 · Stschipkov Alexander. Die Baschowzy - eine neuheidnische Bevegung. // Glaube in der 2. Welt - Schweiz - 1997, 2 Shchipkov Aleksandr and Sergei Filatov. Udmurtia: Ornhodoxy, Paganism, Authority. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1997, vol. 25, 2 Shchipkov Aleksandr. Orthodoxy in Karelia. // Religion, State and Society - England - Oxford - 1997, vol. 25, 2 Shchipkov Aleksandr. Interreligious Relations in Russia after 1917 / Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia. - New York: ORBIS BOOKS. - 1999. P. 77-92 Shchipkov Aleksandr. Rumors of KGB past may help metropolitan win power truggle. // Keston News Service, 05.25.99 · Oleksandr Shchipkov. Church dormitories see the problems of government regulation. // Lyudina I suite - Kiev - 2000, No. 9 · Shchipkov Aleksandr, Fagan Geraldin. Anti-missijnery Legislation in Belgorod. // Frontier - England - Oxford - 2001. No. 4 · Chipkov Alexandre. Orthodoxie Russi: Le debate sur les relations entre l'eglise orthodoxe et l'etat. // Unite des chretiens, No. 123, juillet 2001