Lesson summary on ORKSE in grade 5 'Russian Orthodox Church: from Soviet Russia to the present'

School of Faith

During the Soviet period, the Russian Orthodox Church experienced the most tragic times in its history.

The Soviet authorities considered the Church an accomplice of the tsarist government, and therefore their class and ideological enemy. They launched a war against her on several fronts at once. Laws were passed that ran counter to Christian moral commandments: church marriage lost its legal force, and abortion was allowed for the first time in world practice. Temples were closed, church sacraments (wedding, baptism, etc.) were prohibited. Those who participated were subjected to persecution, for example, fired from their jobs. The authorities conducted anti-religious agitation and propagated scientific theories that proved the falsity of any religion. Representatives of the Church were discredited, holy places were destroyed and desecrated.

The relics of St. Demetrius of Rostov, St. Seraphim of Sarov and other great saints were opened and exhibited in the museum. Before the revolution, these relics were considered incorruptible, and the authorities wanted to confuse the people by exposing the “fakeness” of these relics. However, from the point of view of church teaching, relics do not have to be incorruptible, St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow, reminded the believers of this in his message. He urged people not to be embarrassed and not to lose faith if it turns out that some relics are not incorruptible. The saint also called on the bishops to examine the venerated relics and eliminate possible forgeries.

Under the pretext of fighting counter-revolution, many clergy, members of their families and ordinary believers were arrested and shot. After the death of the holy Patriarch Tikhon in 1925, the authorities did not allow the election of a new patriarch. However, Orthodox traditions were alive among the people. During the country's population census in 1936, more than three-quarters of its residents identified themselves as believers.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, many territories of the Soviet Union were occupied by the enemy. The German authorities allowed the opening of churches and the conduct of services. Spiritual life was especially rapidly restored in the North-West of the country (Pskov Spiritual Mission) by the efforts of Orthodox priests from the Baltic states, where churches had not yet been destroyed. Liberating the occupied territories, the authorities decided not to interfere with church life in them and to soften the persecution of the Church as a whole. In 1943, Orthodox Christians were allowed to choose a patriarch. This became Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky), who previously bore the title of patriarchal locum tenens.

During the time of Khrushchev, a new wave of persecution of Christians began - churches were closed, the Church was subject to strict control by the authorities, intelligence services identified and punished people participating in church sacraments. Priests were forbidden to teach people the basics of the Orthodox faith - this was considered religious propaganda. The majority of Soviet people knew nothing about the Church and did not have the opportunity to read the Gospel and other holy books.

This continued until Perestroika. Only in 1987-1988 did they start talking about the Church again - in connection with preparations for the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus'. Thus began a new, post-Soviet stage in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Decoding How the Russian Church survived in the USSR

Contents of the ninth lecture from the course “History of Orthodox Culture”

With the approach of world war, the authorities gradually abandoned the course of destroying the Church and religion in the country. It must be said that there was no one-time directive ending the repression. It was not in the spirit of the authorities to bind themselves to any written obligations. Moreover, even at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, repressions against the clergy went in parallel with the manifestations of this new policy, already more tolerant of religion. So gradually the Soviet government, the Bolshevik political religion, moves to the second mode of relations between political religion and traditional religion - to the instrumentalization of the latter. The so-called new course of Stalin with the Russian Orthodox Church begins in historiography.

The first manifestations of this new course can be seen already at the end of the 1930s, when the so-called new territories were annexed to the Soviet Union under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia. There were thousands of open Orthodox parishes in these territories, and power did not immediately move to repression against the clergy in the new territories. On the contrary, the patriarchal church was allowed to appoint its own bishops there, which was completely unprecedented in the 1930s. So it turned out that in the Russian Church there is a Metropolitan in Moscow, Metropolitan Alexy (Simansky) in Leningrad, Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) in Riga, Nikolai (Yarushevich) in Kiev and Bishop Alexy (Sergeev) in Moldova.

The turning point in the policy of the Soviet government towards the Church is considered to be 1943, when the famous meeting of Stalin with three metropolitans took place in the Kremlin - and soon the election of a new Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus', which the authorities had not allowed to be carried out since 1925. But we should perceive this moment, this milestone rather as a public statement by Stalin about his new policy, which had already been carried out in secret since the beginning of the Second World War. What goals does the government pursue in the new course policy? And a more private question: what was the role of Stalin personally in the formation of the new policy, what were his personal motives? First of all, we must reject speculation about Stalin's possible religious conversion. He was a pragmatist, and in all the documents of the 1940s - and he closely followed the vicissitudes of church politics - we see the tough, clear hand of a pragmatist, who is interested primarily in the foreign policy potential of the Orthodox Church. But at the same time, he also encouraged a certain mythologization of his own personality, including when it came from church hierarchs. For example, from a rather specific figure, Metropolitan Elijah (Karami) of the Lebanese Mountains, who repeatedly visited the Soviet Union during this period and praised the leader of the peoples.

What goals does the government pursue in the new course policy? First of all, and this is the main thing, it is the mobilization of religious resources for the purposes of the foreign policy of the USSR. Let me remind you that the meeting with the three metropolitans in the Kremlin took place on the eve of the Tehran Conference, where the problem of opening a second front was to be discussed. It was very important for Stalin to show that the Soviet government was tolerant of manifestations of religiosity and that even the patriarchate was being restored in Russia. At the next stage of the development of military operations in the 1940s, it was already a question not only of relations with the allies, but also of attracting Orthodox residents of Eastern Europe - Poland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia - to the side of the USSR. In all these territories, Orthodox believers constituted a significant number. Finally, after the end of the Great Patriotic War, it was a question of using church channels in a complex diplomatic game to win over the Eastern patriarchates to the side of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Stalin entered into a struggle with the United States and Great Britain for influence in the Middle East and other regions of the world, and he also needed the support of church resources there.

In addition, even during the war, the authorities were interested in activating the patriotic sentiments of believers and used the church organization for fiscal purposes, encouraging collections, for example, to the defense fund, from religious organizations and the like. But at the same time (this was a very important feature of the new course), the authorities understood that, by involving the Church in solving their problems, it was necessary to take steps towards the hierarchy, towards the clergy. All this allowed the Church to be reborn and actually rise from oblivion. During this period, there were about 14 thousand churches, several dozen monasteries, two theological academies and nine seminaries. The Church came out of isolation in the international arena and restored ties with other Orthodox churches, which were completely interrupted in the 1930s. And in this emergence of the Church from isolation there was a coincidence of the interests of the authorities and the Church in the 1940s.

The face of the era was Patriarch Alexy I (Simansky), a nobleman who, in his youth, took monasticism out of conviction and heartfelt desire. On the one hand, he embodied this cautious position of the Church, and on the other hand, he quite diplomatically sought new concessions from the authorities. And for believers, he is remembered as a completely unique minister of the Divine Liturgy, who could educate believers on its own, without words, since the Church, of course, had no opportunity to speak any sermons or publish literature. It is interesting that another figure who cannot fail to be mentioned in the context of a conversation about the 1940s was probably Archbishop Luka (Voino-Yasenetsky), a surgeon and at the same time a bishop of the Russian Church, who was imprisoned, exiled, and tortured in prison during the Bolshoi era. terror. He, who was awarded the Stalin Prize during this period for his medical works, embodied a very important mode of life of the Church. A significant number of believers and clergy continued to serve their country with their knowledge and professional skills with all their might—Vladyka Luka operated in the Krasnoyarsk hospital for evacuees—and at the same time carried out church service.

After Stalin's death, for some time the Church enjoyed a certain freedom in relations with the state. 1954 and 1955 were a time of particularly active opening of churches, which, by the way, did not occur in the late Stalinist period. Moreover, a new, more hostile attitude towards the Church of the Khrushchev leadership began to manifest itself in 1954. But the new attack on the Church began in full force in 1958.

The previous period, the so-called new course in relations with the church, is understood by the new Soviet leadership as a deviation from the Leninist policy of the times of the cult of personality. Moreover, the new offensive is quite well planned. It begins with financial reform, which actually meant the withdrawal of funds from the dioceses and patriarchate through an increase, a one-time increase in the tax on candles. The Church’s ability to financially support small parishes, monasteries, and seminaries disappears, and the authorities have an excuse to close them: if believers cannot support them, then why are they needed?

In 1961, the so-called administrative reform was carried out, during which the priest, the rector of the parish, was removed from managing the economic activities of the same parish. The role of the elder, who manages the church economy, increases significantly. And this was a very important step by the Soviet government to acquire tools of control over the church body. It was enough to select candidates for 200–300 of the most significant, richest churches, and these were primarily the cathedral and cemetery churches of each diocese. The headman in these key churches greatly helped the Soviet authorities to control the hierarchy and the Church, primarily by overseeing the deductions of these churches, parishes to the diocese and to the patriarchate. And thus, indirectly, the Soviet government could control both the bishop and the central church administration.

At the same time, a massive propaganda campaign was going on, including the so-called parade of renegades, when a fairly noticeable number of clergy and seminary teachers publicly announced, at the instigation of the Soviet authorities, their renunciation of the faith and the Church.

As a result, by the mid-1960s, half of the churches that were operating in the USSR by the end of the new course were closed. Dozens of monasteries and six of nine seminaries were also closed. But at the same time, the government continued to use church resources in foreign policy, no longer taking its own demands and needs into account. A striking example of such voluntarism in church foreign policy was that Nikita Khrushchev insisted that the Russian Orthodox Church send its observers to the Vatican for the Second Vatican Council, while previously agreements had been reached between the Orthodox churches that they would not participate in any way in this Catholic forum.

After Khrushchev's resignation, the authorities did not intend to give up the acquired instruments of pressure on the Church, although the pressure itself was weakened. Moreover, all attempts on the part of the Church to revise the administrative reform of 1961 were blocked by the authorities. The closure of churches continued, although not as intensively as in the Khrushchev decade. But it is interesting that the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s became a very important time for the internal life of the Church. During this period, at the turn of the 1960s and 70s, new believers appeared - young people who grew up outside the traditional religious environment, but were looking for new forms of church life and church activity. One such example was the community of Alexander Ogorodnikov, his religious seminar. The task of the Church was to find a new language for them, but, of course, its capabilities in this were very limited. In samizdat there appear works of art addressed to new believers, sermons by priests or apologetics, trying to respond to the challenges of anti-religious propaganda, in particular, to reconcile new discoveries, scientific discoveries, with the biblical picture of the world.

In particular, an example of such samizdat apologetics was the book of the prominent geologist and secret priest Father Gleb Kaleda, “The Bible and the Science of the Creation of the World,” which had the subtitle: “An Experience in the Natural Science Interpretation of the Book of Genesis.” It dealt with the first chapter of the first book of the Bible, which describes the seven days of creation, and showed that truly modern scientific data could well be consistent with the biblical narrative. This was very important for the era of the 1960s and 70s, when science was put in the service of anti-religious propaganda.

In general, Orthodox samizdat of those decades was extremely diverse. Prayer books and akathists, lives of saints, works of the Holy Fathers, in particular collections of sayings of the Holy Fathers - “Philokalia” and “Ancient Patericon” - were reprinted and distributed in huge quantities, often even on a commercial basis. This literature was in wide demand and was even quite widespread. But there was also, so to speak, elite Orthodox samizdat. Articles, brochures in which various aspects of spiritual life, and sometimes socio-political, were discussed. On the one hand, there was a book in samizdat by the outstanding Russian psychiatrist Dmitry Evgenievich Melekhov, “Psychiatry and Problems of Spiritual Life,” in which he demonstrated a synthesis of scientific, medical and religious understanding of personality. In fact, it was an unfinished textbook on pastoral psychiatry for seminary students by the author. On the other hand, in samizdat there was a debate between Orthodox liberals and conservatives, soil activists. The pochvennik samizdat magazines “Veche” and “Moscow Collection” by dissident Leonid Borodin were published, but, as a rule, not for long.

Much attention was paid to ideological disputes, but it was not limited to them at all. For example, Tatyana Goricheva published the magazine “Maria” - an Orthodox magazine for women, which contained publications about literature, art and the role of women in Orthodoxy. The group of the Alexander Ogorodnikov I mentioned began to publish the magazine “Community,” which included confessional materials about the path of the young members of this group to faith.

A new turn in the religious policy of the Soviet government occurs during a period of crisis in the Soviet socio-political system, and in church history it is associated primarily with the celebration of the anniversary - the millennium of the Baptism of Rus'. The Church began preparing for this event almost ten years before 1988. She made every possible use of the crisis of the Soviet political system in order to get out of the ghetto and declare her presence, one way or another, in public life. Celebrations dedicated to the millennium of the Baptism of Rus' took place in the summer of 1988. A special, anniversary Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was held, at which nine saints were glorified, who personified its entire thousand-year historical path. And the very next year, at a special Council of Bishops, the Church glorified His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and began to glorify the saints of the Soviet period. It should be noted that Patriarch Tikhon for the Soviet regime at that moment was still a counter-revolutionary, a controversial figure, but the Church was ready to declare him as a saint, confirming the veneration that the patriarch had always had among the people. The glorification of the new martyrs, which followed this throughout the 1990s, seemed to draw a line and give a moral assessment of the entire past century. In the feat of the new martyrs, she glorified the feat of fidelity to their calling, their faith, which these people demonstrated in the era of persecution, when they lived as Christians contrary to general conditions, contrary to what the authorities insisted on.

In October 1990, a new USSR law was adopted - “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”, which effectively dismantled the Soviet control system created by the 1918 decree and 1929 resolution.

In the 20th century, the Russian Church experienced the largest persecution in its history, and perhaps in the history of the Christian Church. Despite this, we can say that in some part of Russia remained a Christian country, because hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions of our compatriots during this era of monstrous persecution continued to live as Christians. The priests remained faithful to their priestly oath, the monks to their vows, and the laity to their faith. On the other hand, the Church was in a ghetto for many decades, subject to a wide variety of sophisticated restrictions. And this could not but affect her life.

If we turn to the sphere of church-state relations, we will see that today the church, like a hundred years ago, is again faced with a secular state. The Holy Council of the Russian Church of 1917–1918 proposed that the future Russian state conclude a legal agreement - a concordat, which would outline mutual rights and obligations. The Soviet period interrupted this process of developing legal norms for interaction between the Church and the state. It seems that in the foreseeable future this process will be resumed and the gradual crystallization of legal forms of state-church relations enshrined in law will begin. This should be assessed positively: any legal regulation is better than voluntarism for both parties.

On the other hand, the legacy of the Soviet period includes the weak involvement of believers in the activities of church institutions - parishes, brotherhoods, and various Christian public organizations. Sometimes, when speaking about this phenomenon, they use the word “de-churching.” At the same time (and this is also a global trend) in many countries people often call themselves believers, but often do not identify themselves with any church institution or identify themselves only formally, without actually participating in the life of its structures, for example parishes. In this regard, for the clergy in our country, as well as in the world, the task arises of starting and gradually deepening a dialogue with society, with their flock. It was extremely difficult during the Soviet years, but even then interesting trends began to operate that could help him.

Let's pay attention. Today in Russia we are not dealing with the mechanical restoration of what was once lost, but with the process of inculturation, with the creative process of the Church’s entry into the modern, modern culture of Russia and all countries of the post-Soviet space. This process began back in the 1970s with the awakening of the first interest in the Church and its culture among young, educated city dwellers. In the 1980s, during the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus', this interest was, as it were, legalized, and in the 1990s and 2000s it was further developed. During this process, a new church culture is born, and a new language of communication between the Church and society is developed. For the first time in its history, the Russian Church is dealing with such a society - urban, not rural, secularized, or “de-churched,” fairly highly educated, informational. These characteristics of modern society are an objective reality, and the Church will have to use all its creative potential to translate its eternal teaching into its language. It is quite obvious that inculturation (like desecularization) is a long-term process, and we will see its obvious fruits only after several generations.  

Religion and Soviet power

In Tsarist Russia, religion occupied an important place in the life of society, being part of the state apparatus. The dominant role among many faiths was occupied by the Orthodox Church, which was led by the Synod. All religions on the vast territory of the country faithfully served the Russian autocracy, hindering and condemning any attempts to love freedom.

Do you believe in God?

NOT REALLY

As a result of the Bolshevik coup in 1917, the Tsar's power was overthrown, and the country plunged into chaos for many years. The once omnipotent religion also fully felt the destructive influence of revolutionary changes - the communists, who seized power, planned to completely eradicate any religious feelings from people. The desire of believers to ask for help from heaven was ridiculed, denied and forbidden. From now on, only communist ideology was the indisputable authority and the basis of all transformations.

The position of religion in the USSR was determined by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars adopted in 1918. From now on, all religious organizations - and in pre-revolutionary Russia they were very numerous - lost the role they had in society. They were no longer legal entities; all religions were separated from the state and education from the church.

The population of Russia and the territories near it has long been religious. The authority of the church was unquestionable. People associated the eternal desire for the best only with God. The Bolsheviks (later the Communists) wanted all the people’s hopes to be placed on the new government. Religion was considered a relic of the past, an obstacle to change, “the opium of the people.” It was supposed to replace religion with universal atheism - a complete denial of the existence of God and his leading role in people's lives.

Studying the published historical documents of that era, one can sometimes find in them completely contradictory information about the state of parish life on the far outskirts of Russia. Thus, describing the events of 1917, one of the Altai missionaries complains that local residents (Kalmyks) began to have a negative attitude towards the clergy and psalm-readers, considering them “adherents of the former Tsar Nicholas.” This state of affairs was greatly facilitated by delegates from the Bolshevik Party arriving from the capitals. However, the author o.[1] Describing his current affairs at the parish, Hieromonk Dimitry (Startsev) writes at the end of 1917: “In general, the life of the parish flows peacefully and calmly, as before. Regarding the supposed new orders in the parish, we can frankly say that not everything here is suitable and applicable... Therefore, we can say frankly that we are going through these difficult times with relative ease”[2]. These two examples are opposite, and at the same time they clearly show all the accumulated problems of parish life. If in the first example it is clearly visible that the local population associates the Church with the Tsar, which, however, is not surprising, then in the second case we see, and this is the same Altai region, a fairly close-knit community of parishioners led by a shepherd, living measuredly and patriarchal. A significant number of similar examples can be given.

The New Year of 1918 brought with it new challenges for the Russian people. In addition to the fact that the process of destruction of the entire state management system began, the country was plunged into a bloody Civil War. Endless slogans in the press and in public squares, demonstrations and strikes plunged the country into unprecedented chaos. Trying to direct the actions of the new government into a civilized legal field and prevent internal escalation, after the Liturgy celebrated in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on January 1, 1918, Patriarch Tikhon, addressing the believers, said that the Bolsheviks “wish with their reforms and decrees to benefit not only the unfortunate Russian people , but also the whole world, and even peoples much more cultured than us”[3].

To complete the historical picture of that time, we present the memories of eyewitnesses, noting that these memories recorded the situation of current events in the capital. “On the streets, the tricolor imperial flags were replaced by red ones, red banners appeared among the troops... Young monks and liberal “priests” were unconsciously happy for some reason and walked around “Gogol”, as if they had been given a ruble. The elderly monastery “elders” and venerable archpriests, who had turned gray in consistory intrigues, behaved evasively and kept a gloomy silence. The small spiritual servants “dared”: they sang revolutionary songs while drunk, went to rallies, even “performed” at them in front of the metropolitan rabble eagerly staring at the new product...”[4]. “The year 1918 was full of events, many of which were completely misunderstood by the vast majority of ordinary people. The dominant feelings among the population, according to eyewitnesses, were confusion and fear. The Bolsheviks emerged from the World War with the shameful Peace of Brest-Litovsk and unleashed the Civil War, which for many years divided the united people into “us” and “aliens” - “red” and “white” [5].

Seduced by the fiery revolutionary speeches of the Bolshevik agitators, who promised them the distribution of land, the peasants sometimes made statements and resolutions. So, in January 1918, residents of the village of Aleksandrovka at their gathering decided: “We warmly welcome the Council of People's Commissars for their activities against all robbers - capitalists, traitors to the Revolution... All power goes to the working people. Long live the Workers' and Peasants' Government - the Council of People's Commissars. Down with the compromisers. To the post - saboteurs"[6].

In conditions of political confusion and, as a consequence, rampant crime in Moscow and other cities, parish unions are beginning to be created. Their competence included the protection of Orthodox parishes and churches. In Moscow, A.D. was elected head of these unions. Samarin, whose goal was “to unite believers in order to promote the revitalization of parish life”[7]. Under the new government, such unions did not last long, but still they left a good memory of themselves among the parishioners.

In January 1918, the press published a decree “On the separation of the Church from the state and the school from the Church,” the draft of which was published on December 5, 1917[8]. This document actually laid the foundation for the almost complete lack of rights of the Church, although it contained a number of provisions on the free exercise of any religion. The question of the legal status of the Church and the latter’s separation from the state government system was urgent and acute even in pre-revolutionary Russia. Many legal scholars have repeatedly spoken out about this long-standing Russian problem. Let's turn to the most famous authors.

The religious freedoms that the state gave and ensured to its subjects were quite diverse. In particular, Associate Professor of Canon Law N.A. Zaozersky in 1888 formulates and justifies five main types of church-state relations. It is interesting that at that time, domestic and foreign canonists did not even theoretically consider the possibility of the existence of religious structures and the unification of believers into certain communities in the conditions of the strict anti-religious policy of the state. Of the “types” of church-state relations proposed by Zaozersky, only one can be accepted: “3) a state that did not interfere in the activities of the Church and religious associations”[9]. Perhaps the first stage of establishing the new Soviet power was based on this principle. Evidence of this can be considered the “Decree on the separation of the Church from the state and the school from the Church,” which proclaimed freedom of conscience and religion. This legal act was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on January 20 (February 2), 1918. In essence, this formulation goes back to the conclusions made by the Russian legal scholar A.D. Gradovsky: “religious freedom presupposed the right of an individual to independently, without interference from state or church authorities, become a follower of one or another religion and follow it without hindrance”[10]. However, it was precisely on the basis of this document of the new government that all religious organizations were deprived of their property rights and legal personality, which was recorded in points 12 and 13[11]. The Bolsheviks’ understanding of freedom of conscience was fundamentally different from the radical democratic European law of the 19th and 20th centuries, although one should not forget about the upheavals that took place in France in 1789[12].

Analyzing the works of Russian scientists such as S.A. Kotlyarovsky, A.A. Sokolov[13], V.D. Spasovich[14], in the field of state-church relations, it should be noted that this topic was quite widely discussed and, therefore, relevant at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Of the listed researchers, S.A. spoke out most unconventionally in those conditions. Kotlyarovsky. In his opinion, “the exercise of complete freedom of conscience... requires the separation of the Church from the state, and all civil relations in which the Church has so far taken part - registration of births, marriages, etc. - become purely secular...”[15 ]. This is actually Kotlyarovsky’s theoretical reasoning under the new government will find its practical application and contributes to the final dissolution of legal relations between the state and the Church. Publicist and sociologist V.V. Even in pre-revolutionary times, Bervi-Flerovsky advocated the separation of Church and state: “people should support the clergy at their own expense, and no one should force a person to belong to one faith or another”[16].

Obviously, while observing a certain formal legality, the new authorities relied on the opinions of well-known Russian jurists, but in reality the situation was completely different, so different that even in theoretical discussions there is no diagram of the relationship between the Church and the state that the Bolsheviks introduced into life. As a modern historian and lawyer rightly noted, “with the adoption of the Decree, the process of separation of the Church from the state began, carried out by the Bolsheviks, which gave rise to repressions against the Church”[17].

Two days after the publication of the Decree, the Local Council adopted a Resolution in which it gave a legal assessment of the innovations declared by the Bolsheviks. The Resolution stated: “1. The Decree on the separation of Church and State, issued by the Council of People's Commissars, represents, under the guise of a law on freedom of conscience, a malicious attack on the entire system of life of the Orthodox Church and an act of open persecution against it...”[18]. Such a statement by the members of the Council and the Patriarch was extremely negatively received by the Bolshevik authorities, who understood that a declarative statement alone was not enough. It is necessary to create a new legal framework for the new government.

In order to give the Decree a certain legitimacy, and this is quite obvious, a little later and we will pay special attention to this, other mechanisms and instruments of legal influence will be used. Although it is worth paying attention to the testimony of eyewitnesses who claimed that the confusion, especially in the press, was unimaginable and the society of that time no longer took all this seriously[19].

In the spring of 1918, the Local Council continued its work. On April 20, a cathedral decision adopted the Decree on the Orthodox parish and the parish Charter, so long awaited in the Russian Church. On the basis of these documents, the parish was endowed with the rights of a legal entity, and the management of the parish was carried out by a rector appointed by the ruling bishop, together with the parish council. All financial, repair and construction issues must be discussed at the general parish council, which includes members of the clergy and parishioners of both sexes who are at least 25 years old[20]. The documents adopted by the Council concerning the organization of parishes and the optimization of parish life were expected, but they could no longer come into force in these historical conditions.

The January decrees issued by the new Bolshevik government needed legal validity. Already in the summer of 1918, at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Constitution of the RSFSR was adopted, Article 5 of which reads: “In order to ensure real freedom of conscience for the working people, the Church is separated from the state and the school from the Church, and freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.” [21]. After the adoption of the Constitution, all its provisions automatically became norms of constitutional law, and the VIII (from 1922 V) department was called upon to monitor compliance with the 13th article of the Constitution. Already on August 30, 1918, the People's Commissariat of Justice officially recognized that the Church had ceased to exist as a legal entity. Deputy People's Commissar of Justice P.A. worked a lot when drawing up official documents of the Soviet government. Krasikov is one of the ideologists of the anti-religious campaign in Russia. This now made it possible to legally separate buildings, property, lands, etc. from church property.

Let us note that according to Lenin’s decree, as mentioned above, the Church under the Bolshevik regime lost its status as a legal entity. Now the Church did not belong to churches, monasteries, shelters and schools. It is worth paying attention to the historical fact that schools and seminaries were removed from the church department and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education as early as June 20, 1917[22].

After August 1918, all property and buildings belonging to the Church came under the jurisdiction of local Soviets. Locally, it was necessary to organize appropriate groups of lay people (at least 20), and only with them could local authorities enter into an agreement on renting a church building for worship. The clergy and diocesan authorities, deprived not only of legal rights, but also of the right to vote, did not participate in this agreement[23]. The conclusion of agreements for the use of temple buildings and property had to be concluded with local authorities within a 2-month period.

Thus, on the basis of the legislative acts adopted by the Soviet government, “the parish is the foundation of the Church” was actually deprived of any rights and could be “legally” liquidated under any pretext. This practice, given the arbitrariness of local authorities, is becoming widespread. Researcher of church-state relations A.V. Mendyukov o[24].

Having begun its work fruitfully, the Local Council interrupted its meetings in September 1918 due to the confiscation by the Bolsheviks of the building of the Moscow Seminary, where the plenary sessions were held. In fact, it was the Bolsheviks who dissolved the Council and thus placed the Church in the most difficult conditions, which partly provoked the emergence of the phenomenon of renovationism - the “Living Church”. However, the new government did not need such a “pocket Church”; its goal was to destroy the canonical Church.

Strict control and “guardianship” of all church structures, starting with the Primate of the Church and ending with the clergy and clergy, was carried out from the beginning of 1918 by the Cheka, then by the OGPU and then by the NKVD, which always had special views on the implementation of “church policy.” It is worth quoting a fragment from a letter from the Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky to the head of the Cheka department M.Ya. Latsis: “My opinion: the Church is falling apart, we need to help this, but in no way revive it in an updated form. Therefore, church policy should be led by the Cheka, and not anyone else... Only the Cheka can maneuver for the sole purpose of corrupting the priests”[25]. It should be noted that, while maintaining such a strategic line, the Bolsheviks primarily focused on the disintegration of the white clergy, which was as close as possible to the common people. “The Cheka were supposed to bring “decay” and “destruction” “into the very midst of the believers, and that’s all””[26]. By the end of 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the regulations on the Cheka, on the basis of which local Soviets began to create provincial and district Chekas. By the end of the year, 40 provincial and 356 district Chekas were formed[27].

The devastation in the country and the impoverishment of the people also affected the number of private material donations to the city parish churches. By the beginning of the 20s, compared with the pre-revolutionary period, the circle collection, when summarizing various data, decreased by 75%. In such a situation, there was virtually nothing to pay for the work of singers and watchmen; there was not enough money to buy firewood and beeswax. Great difficulties arose when paying for housing for the families of the clergy.

The situation of the rural clergy looked somewhat better, if that is how one can characterize this period. In pre-revolutionary times, circle collections in rural parishes were extremely meager, but parishioners brought subsistence products to the church. This practice continued in the first years of Soviet power. Let us not, however, forget about the general depletion of agricultural activity in the province, caused by surplus appropriation, crop failures and inept agrarian policy, if such was carried out during these years.

“As a result of a well-organized action and the proclamation of decrees, the Bolsheviks seemed to succeed, because this in some way influenced the outflow of weak-spirited Orthodox Christians from the Church. But true believers saw only sacrilege in these acts.”[28] Certain contradictions began to grow throughout the parishes. This was due to the fact that even the meager funding of the clergy and psalm-readers ceased under the new conditions. If the priest could still receive some donations from parishioners, most often agricultural products, then the deacon and especially the psalm-readers were actually left without support. Therefore, psalm-readers most often left for other jobs or enlisted in the Red Army. Although this situation existed almost everywhere during these years, it did not have a fundamental impact on the course of liturgical life. The places of psalm-readers were occupied voluntarily and free of charge by lay volunteers, both men and women. In essence, the definitions of the Local Council of the Russian Church come into force: “The Council opened up the opportunity for women to participate in the activities of deanery and diocesan meetings, but not in diocesan councils and courts. In exceptional cases, pious Christian women could be admitted to the position of psalm-readers, but without inclusion in the clergy.”[29]

The role of women in these historical conditions in parish life is increasing. At parish churches they organized all kinds of sisterhoods and circles; there was a considerable percentage of women in the parish councils. During these years, predominantly women continued, in those places where it was possible, to conduct religious and moral conversations and teach children prayers, Sacred History, church regulations and catechism. Such classes took place at parish churches, and if such an opportunity was no longer available, then in private homes. In some parishes the number of pupils reached several dozen.

The revitalization of parish life during this historical period can also be observed in the example of the so-called parish brotherhoods. They appeared in large city parishes back in the imperial period, and under the new government they largely revived their work. By the turn of the 20s, at least 20 similar brotherhoods functioned in the northern capital. Among them we can note the brotherhoods: Zechariah and Elizabeth, Nikolskoye (Spasskoye), St. Andrew of Crete, St. Panteleimon, Trinity. Moreover, the last two appeared already in the Soviet period. Among the brotherhoods organized in Moscow, the most famous during the period under study was the “Moscow Brotherhood of the Union of Zealots for the Preaching of Orthodoxy” under the leadership of the priest Roman Medvedev. The brotherhood, which consisted of more than 100 people, had its own charter, approved by Patriarch Tikhon. The breadth of the brotherhood's activities was quite extensive and largely fruitful in those historical conditions. In pursuance of the decision of the Council, brotherhoods were opened in other cities of the country, while the authorities were reluctant to give their permission to their opening.

At the beginning of 1919, the military situation on different fronts sharply worsened. In February the offensive of the Polish troops began, in March the offensive of A.V. Kolchak, in May the NN offensive. Yudenich, A.I. Denikin launched an offensive on the Southern Front, P.N. Wrangel took Tsaritsyn. The largest world powers - Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the USA - expressed support for all these speeches[30]. Great Britain and France signed an agreement on joint intervention against Soviet power on December 10 (23), 1917.

The internal unstable situation in the country was growing every day. In this regard, “On February 24, 1919, the Secret Department (Cheka) was formed, which was tasked with suppressing the anti-Soviet activities of “bourgeois” and “petty-bourgeois” parties and groups, as well as combating the hostile activities of the clergy and sectarianism”[31]. Now any mention of the Church or Patriarch Tikhon could clearly be equated to counter-revolutionary activity against Soviet power and the power of the working people.

The main centers of the counter-revolution, according to the Bolsheviks, were Russian monasteries. Under this very convincing pretext, a campaign to close the monasteries begins. The first of the Russian monasteries to close was the ancient Miracle Monastery in the Kremlin, and a detachment of the Kremlin security commandant's office was transferred to its premises. In 1919, a total of 20 monasteries were closed; in 1921, the scale of closures increased and there were already 573 closed monasteries, which is already more than half of all pre-revolutionary monasteries in Russia[32]. In some cases, residents of monasteries managed to remain within the walls of the abolished monasteries on the terms of a kind of labor artel with the status of a parish, but all this was only temporary.

As an example, we can point to the Moscow Donskoy Monastery, which was closed in 1919. It was here that one of the first labor communities was registered, consisting of former inhabitants of the monastery. The inhabitants, evicted from the walls of the monastery, carried out various economic work on its territory and at the same time held divine services in one of the churches, but in a parish version[33]. Such artels did not last long, as the government accused the Church of trying to create its own “state with a separate economy” in the country. By the end of the 20s, the existence of such labor artels was discontinued throughout the USSR.

To complete the historical study, it is necessary to turn to the memories of eyewitnesses and trace how they saw parish life in cities and rural areas. In this matter, the scientific research of V.S. is interesting. Buzin, who collected many interesting facts from the life of villagers in the first years of the new government. In particular, he notes that matchmaking and marriage took place in the same way as before. In rural churches, no one was in a hurry to hand over registry books to the new authorities, and the district authorities were far away and continued to record baptisms, weddings and funeral services in the old metric books. New forms of established Bolshevik christenings and acts of marriage were also ignored in the villages. The practice of choosing a bride, which had developed over several centuries, “continued to remain very significant during the Soviet period of history”[34]. At the same time, the researcher notes that the practice of so-called “thieves’ weddings”, compared to the pre-revolutionary period, has sharply increased, and the consequences of such arbitrariness were negative[35].

During this period of parish life, the ritual side, according to eyewitnesses, becomes more lively. Here is what a witness of those years notes: “The square in front of the church, like a market, is crowded with people and horses. You can't get into the church. In a year when there are many weddings, two priests, taking turns resting, perform the wedding from 10 am to midnight... They perform the wedding at an accelerated pace: four couples at a time. Crowns are not worn over the newlyweds, they are placed directly on their heads, and the priest begins the ceremony by leading the eight people around.”[36]

Eyewitnesses also describe the funeral ceremonies of those years: “The priest, if this had not been done before, gave the deceased in the hand, as defined by folk vocabulary, a “passport” (aka “document”), sometimes a “wreath” was also put on the head in churches. During the persecution of the Church, these functions were performed by “nuns”[37].

In parts of Russia remote from the center, where missionary activity was carried out and missions worked in previous years, the situation was more complex and ambiguous. This is what missionary priest Makariy Abyshkin writes in his diary: “Dark, gloomy days have come for the clergy. It entered a period of persecution and torment. The torment is not only moral, but physical. Freedom in the countryside is sometimes understood as freedom from everything; the new way of life is interpreted as permission for everything”[38]. Archpriest Grigory Lukashevich recalled about the events of 1919: “There was a terrible decline in religious life, especially when the rule of the Bolsheviks began. Everything sacred was trampled underfoot... Once in the winter I had to personally carry military commissariat officials on my cart, performing the duties of a coachman. The priest was not allowed to walk down the street.”[39]

Lack of funding and complete impoverishment, especially of deacons and psalm-readers, was a serious problem in the first years of the new government. It is worth quoting the words of one of the parish priests, who spoke with bitterness about[40].

The short period from 1917 to 1920 can confidently be called the first period of the relationship between the Church and a certain still extremely weak and unstable Bolshevik regime. The deprivation of the Church of a legal entity and the confiscation of existing real estate and material wealth should, according to the theoretical reasoning of K. Marx, deprive the Church of its viability and lead to natural extinction, but this did not happen. The reasoning of the German theorist turned out to be unviable.

“It seems that the chain of political upheavals in the country, which began in February 1917 and up to the confiscation of church valuables in 1922, left no hope for the Orthodox clergy to remain “out of politics” and take a “neutral position.” She didn’t leave, because the overwhelming majority of his flock knew for sure that they did not want the old order and the old life to return, but the majority did not know and did not realize how to live “in a new way”[41].

An important point of this most complex and contradictory period in all respects is that that insignificant part of the flock, which in the previous historical period had an extremely negative attitude towards the Church, naturally fell away. At the same time, the majority, which was less typical for the previous historical period, on the contrary, united around the priest-rector and formed a strong parish community. “...but, humiliated by the authorities, the people were in no hurry to share the atheistic beliefs of the self-proclaimed “elite.” On the contrary, he resisted with all his might, defending the faith of the fathers and church piety, which over a long millennium had entered the blood and flesh of many generations.”[42]

[1] Georgy Kreidun, prot. Missionary notes and diaries of employees of the Altai mission. Barnaul, 2021. P. 160.

[2] Georgy Kreidun, prot. Missionary notes and diaries of employees of the Altai mission. Barnaul, 2021. P. 164.

[3] Quoted. by: Winter V.F. The Russian Orthodox Church during the famine of 1921–1922 in Soviet Russia. // Church in the history of Russia. Collection 10. M., 2015. P. 95.

[4] Historical archive. 1997 No. 3 (26) vol. 5. M., pp. 70, 72.

[5] Novikov V.V. Essays on the history of the Archangel Michael Church. M., 2013. P. 126.

[6] Donenko Nikolai, prot. New Martyrs of Berdyansk. Feodosia - M., “Koktebel”, 2006. P. 53.

[7] Russian Orthodox Church XX century. M., Sretensky Monastery, 2008. P. 97.

[8]Russian Orthodox Church XX century. M., Sretensky Monastery, 2008. P. 95.

[9] Zaozersky N.A. Law of the Orthodox Greek-Eastern Russian Church as a subject of special legal science // Addition to the publication of the works of the Holy Fathers in Russian translation for 1888. Part 41. K. 2. M., 1888. P. 85–92.

[10] Gradovsky A.D. Collected works. T. 7. The beginning of Russian state law. Part 1. About the state structure. St. Petersburg, 1901, pp. 333–335.

[11] Quote. by: Mamedzade A.A. Freedom of conscience. Origins, formation, legal protection. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 73.

[12] Odintsov M.I. Russian Federation between the clerical past and the secular present - problems of choice and perspective. // Religious diversity in the Russian metropolis. SPb., 2014. P. 13.

[13] Sokolov A.A. Freedom of conscience and religious tolerance (historical-critical essay) // Bulletin of Law, 1905. No. 5. pp. 23–31.

[14] Spasovich V.D. Presentation of the report “On crimes against faith.” Minutes of the St. Petersburg Law Society. // Journal of Civil and Criminal Law, 1882. May. P. 16.

[15] Kotlyarovsky S.A. Freedom of conscience // Freedom of conscience: literary and philosophical collection. M., 1906. P. 193.

[16] Quoted. by: Mamedzade A.A. Freedom of conscience. Origins, formation, legal protection. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 65.

[17] Mamedzade A.A. Freedom of conscience. Origins, formation, legal protection. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 74.

[18] Russian Orthodox Church XX century. M., Sretensky Monastery, 2008. P. 96.

[19] Gessen I.V. Russian archive. 3 (5–6). M. "Terra", 1991. P. 235.

[20] Russian Orthodox Church XX century. M., Sretensky Monastery, 2008. P. 104.

[21] Quote. by: Zaerko A.L. History of the Belarusian Church. Desecrated Orthodoxy 1917–1939. Smolensk, 2013. P. 31.

[22] Russian Orthodox Church XX century. M., 2008. P. 80.

[23] Pospelovsky D. Orthodox Church in the history of Rus', Russia and the USSR. M., BBI, 1996. P. 219.

[24] Mendyukov A.V. Russian Orthodox Church in the Middle Volga region at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. M., 2021. P. 59.

[25] Quote. by: Zaerko A.L. History of the Belarusian Church. Desecrated Orthodoxy 1917–1939. Smolensk, 2013. P. 56; Perov S.G. Russian Orthodox Church of the time of Patriarch Tikhon. Novosibirsk, 2013. P.61.

[26] Petrov S.G. Russian Orthodox Church of the time of Patriarch Tikhon. Novosibirsk, 2013. P. 63.

[27] Khristoforov V.S. History of Soviet state security agencies 1917–1991. M., 2005. P. 30.

[28] Zaerko A.L. History of the Belarusian Church. Desecrated Orthodoxy 1917–1939. Smolensk, 2013. P. 54.

[29] Tsypin Vladislav, prot. Church law course. Klin, Christian Life, 2004. P. 367.

[30] Khristoforov V.S. History of Soviet state security agencies 1917–1991. M., 2005. P. 23.

[31] Khristoforov V.S. History of Soviet state security agencies 1917–1991. M., 2005. P. 35.

[32] Pospelovsky D. The Orthodox Church in the history of Rus', Russia and the USSR. M., BBI, 1996. P. 242.

[33] Artyushenko M.V. Donskoy Monastery. M., 2015. P. 184.

[34] Buzin V.S. Birth, marriage and death in traditional South Russian rituals. St. Petersburg, “Nestor-History”, 2015. P. 129.

[35] Buzin V.S. Birth, marriage and death in traditional South Russian rituals. St. Petersburg, “Nestor-History”, 2015. P. 130.

[36] Gagentorn N. Wedding in Saltykovskaya parish. Morshansky u. Tambov // Materials on freedom and family-tribal system of the peoples of the USSR. V. 1. L., 1926. P. 176; Buzin V.S. Birth, marriage and death in traditional South Russian rituals. St. Petersburg, “Nestor-History”, 2015. P. 385.

[37] Buzin V.S. Birth, marriage and death in traditional South Russian rituals. St. Petersburg, “Nestor-History”, 2015. P. 592.

[38] Kreidun Georgy, prot. Missionary notes and diaries of employees of the Altai mission. Barnaul, 2021. P. 170.

[39] Zaerko A.L. History of the Belarusian Church. Desecrated Orthodoxy 1917–1939. Smolensk, 2013. P. 39.

[40] Zaerko A.L. History of the Belarusian Church. Desecrated Orthodoxy 1917–1939. Smolensk, 2013. P. 48.

[41] Odintsov I.I. Patriarch of victory. M., 2015. 191.

[42] Donenko Nikolai, prot. New Martyrs of Berdyansk. Feodosia - M., “Koktebel”, 2006. P. 181.

Religion during the Revolution

The new revolutionary government, wanting to have absolute influence on society, took an extremely hostile position towards religious organizations. Denying and ridiculing faith in God, the new state declared a real war on the churches, taking away their lands and temples. Now all church property belonged to the state; The churches could not carry out any activities other than religious ones.

Under the guise of “revolutionary necessity,” many churches were destroyed and their property was looted. Thousands of clergy lost their parishes, and some lost their lives.

During the period of mass organization of collective farms - collectivization - the goal was even set of creating new agricultural associations “without priests and churches.”

Russian history

ABSTRACT PLAN

Introduction

Church in 1917-1923

Renovation movement and “non-rememberers”

Years of repression and the Great Patriotic War

Post-war period

Perestroika period

Conclusion

Literature

In Russia, Orthodoxy and its organization - the Russian Orthodox Church - have historically been closely associated with autocratic power and formed its ideological foundation. Until 1917, the position of the church seemed unshakable. It was a powerful organization, numbering more than 50 thousand priests and deacons who served in 48 thousand parish churches. The church administered 35 thousand primary schools and 58 seminaries, as well as more than a thousand active monasteries, which housed about 95 thousand monastics. The Orthodox faith was an important component of the consciousness of people, especially peasants. However, after the formation of the Soviet Republic, a long period of confrontation between the authorities and the church began in the country. This essay describes the main stages that determined the relationship between the church and the Soviet state.

Church in 1917-1923

The beginning of a long confrontation between the Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox Church was the decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the confiscation of all church educational institutions. In response, the Local Council, which was working at that time, called the Bolshevik “army an invasion of the Antichrist and raging atheism.” The next normative act of the Bolsheviks was the Decree on Freedom of Conscience of January 20, 1918. Formally, the decree proclaimed freedom of conscience, and subsequently acts were issued that were supposed to ensure this right. On the other hand, by law, believers were deprived of the opportunity to spread their religious beliefs and engage in charitable activities. Religious associations did not have the status of a legal entity, i.e. believers did not have the rights that, in accordance with international legal acts, are included in the concept of the right to freedom of conscience.

In the first years of the Civil War, the Russian Orthodox Church came out in support of the White movement. The Church, led by Patriarch Tikhon, expected the fall of the “god-fighting” Soviet power and was ready to contribute to this fall. Only in 1919 did the highest church hierarchs abandon open calls for the overthrow of the Bolshevik government and publicly declare such a refusal. Nevertheless, about 10 thousand representatives of the Orthodox clergy were among the victims of the Civil War. By the summer of 1920, all major church property was nationalized. Part of the nationalized property was transferred to church communities for “use.”

In the early 1920s. An unprecedented drought in the Volga region and a number of other regions of the country created the threat of starvation for millions of people. On February 23, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the party issued a decree according to which local councils were asked to withdraw, within a month, from church property transferred for the use of groups of believers of all religions, those jewelry, the withdrawal of which did not significantly affect the cult itself. These jewels should have been donated to the Famine Relief Commission Fund. Patriarch Tikhon opposed the implementation of this decree. He motivated his position by the fact that the church is already actively working to help the hungry. Riots began in a number of cities in defense of the church. The authorities used this resistance as a pretext for reprisals against the most prominent church figures. Based on the facts of unrest and protests, trials were organized, some of the accused were shot. The patriarch himself was involved in one of these trials as a witness; he was soon arrested. The Russian Orthodox Church was left without its leader. The long-standing crisis of trust among Orthodox believers in “spiritual shepherds” has been aggravated by the crisis of church leadership.

Renovation movement and “non-rememberers”

The resolution of the crisis of traditional Russian Orthodoxy was undertaken by supporters of the liberal-renovationist movement, who were in opposition to Tikhon and condemned “Tikhonism” for replacing religion with politics. They advocated unconditional loyalty to the Soviet regime. In their opinion, it was necessary to begin this process with the removal of Patriarch Tikhon from the leadership of the church and the reorganization of church administration. The patriarch's being under investigation was perceived by them as a favorable condition for starting reform activities.

Three reform groups arose, united by a common goal - the modernization of Russian Orthodoxy in relation to the new social conditions that emerged after the victory of the October Revolution of 1917. To realize their goal, they sought to use the support of state power.

These groups were called “renovationist”, and their association was called the “renovationist church”. Within a year after the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon, the renovationists managed, using the support of Soviet power, to subjugate most of the country's parishes. However, Renovation churches were empty: many laypeople were embarrassed by the radicalism of the movement and numerous disagreements between the leaders of Renovation groups. All this made the projects they proposed for church reforms unviable, which was soon discovered.

On April 29, 1923, the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, prepared by the renovationists, opened in Moscow. The Council approved the socialist revolution and condemned capitalism as an anti-Christian state of social life. The anathema against the Soviet government, emanating from Tikhon, was canceled. The patriarch himself was accused of counter-revolutionary activities and was deprived not only of the patriarchal rank, but also of monasticism.

Renovationists actively collaborated with the party press, publishing all sorts of fabrications about the patriarch. Realizing the danger looming over the church, and seeing the sad results of persecution against it and internal discord, Patriarch Tikhon addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR on June 3 (16), 1923. The Patriarch admitted the fallacy of some of his previous messages regarding the actions of the Soviet state, and confirmed his loyalty to the state power established in Russia. The letter allowed Tikhon to be released.

This document is of fundamental importance: it authorized the transition of the entire Russian Orthodox Church to a position of loyalty to the Soviet regime. Thus, the renovationists lost their main advantage over the Tikhonites. With a message dated July 15, 1923, Tikhon announced that he was returning to the leadership of the church. The council of 1923, which defrocked him, was characterized by him as a “non-church gathering”, the decisions of which have no canonical force. Thus, within the framework of the once united Russian Orthodoxy, two independent churches were formed: the patriarchal, uniting the traditionalists of the Tikhonites, and the renovationist, consisting of adherents of church reforms. They were in a state of mutual confrontation, which worsened year by year.

One of the initiators of this confrontation was Patriarch Tikhon himself, who, after his release, launched a broad campaign to discredit renovationism in the eyes of the laity and clergy. The ranks of their supporters began to gradually thin out.

At the same time, a new split soon emerged. Part of the clergy and laity, led by Metropolitan Joseph of Leningrad, did not support the course of unconditional loyalty to the authorities. The so-called “catacomb” or “true Orthodox Church” was formed. The clergy and laity of this association were also called “non-rememberers” for their refusal to remember Sergius (who became locum tenens of the patriarchal throne after Tikhon’s death) and state authorities in their prayers. They called Soviet power “the power of the Antichrist,” and the Russian Orthodox Church “the handmaiden of the Antichrist.” Soon, almost all of the “non-rememberers” ended up in camps and exile.

Years of repression and the Great Patriotic War

In the second half of the 1930s, during the mass arrests of “enemies of the people,” the church was also subjected to repression. Their scale was such that, according to some sources, by 1939 only about 400 priests, 5 bishops and metropolitans remained at large.

In 1940, there were only 4,225 operating churches in the USSR, and over 3 thousand of them were in the western regions, which became part of it in 1939-1940.

The war radically changed the policy of the Soviet government towards the church. These changes during the war period were caused by significant religious revival in the temporarily occupied territories and the natural desire of the authorities to neutralize the impact of fascist propaganda. The opening of churches in temporarily occupied territories and the loyalty of the German authorities to the church looked more attractive to believers than the recent actions against the church by the Bolshevik authorities. J.V. Stalin feared that the outbreak of the war could exacerbate the contradictions between the state and the church, but this did not happen. Despite spiritual lack of freedom and persecution, believers took an active part in the fight against the enemy, and the church in every possible way contributed to the rise of patriotic feelings of the people. The authorities did not prevent the clergy from distributing patriotic appeals, which before the war was a violation of the censorship law. Anti-religious propaganda on a state scale has stopped. By October 1941, almost all anti-religious publications were closed. The atheistic magazine “Under the Banner of Marxism” began to publish articles about the great Russian people, its historical figures and the heroism of soldiers, i.e. the authorities assigned new tasks of patriotic education to the editors of the magazine, which did not imply confrontation with the church. The Church not only consoled, supported faith in victory, condemned desertion and surrender, but also provided direct material assistance to the state and the army, which became one of the areas of patriotic service to the Motherland of the clergy and believers. Since the summer of 1941, all Orthodox parishes in the country began collecting donations for the Defense Fund. 40 T-34 tanks were built with the money of believers. Representatives of the clergy took part in digging trenches and worked in military hospitals set up in monasteries. Many members of the clergy were awarded medals for their patriotic activities.

September 4, 1943 became a milestone of the new religious policy, the “new state-church course,” when the period of organizational revival and strengthening of the Russian Orthodox Church began. This began with the meeting of Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nikolai with Stalin in the Kremlin. Permission was received to elect a patriarch. Not only was there an official reconciliation between the state and the Orthodox Church, but also recognition of it as a de facto integral part of the regime. On November 28, 1943, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the procedure for opening churches,” according to which the rights of believers were significantly expanded. Corresponding powers were also granted to local authorities. On November 28, 1943, the Council of People's Commissars authorized the opening of the Theological Institute in Moscow. In May 1944, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, theological and pastoral courses were opened in Saratov. At the end of 1943-1944. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR equated the highest clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate in the sense of privileges with the highest party-Soviet bureaucrats. Church holidays, religious processions, and rituals were allowed. However, all these measures did not at all imply the return of the church to free status. Much of what the state promised remained on paper. So, for 1944-1945. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the government of the USSR, which was created by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of September 14, 1943, received 5,770 applications for the opening of churches, but only 414 applications were granted.

Post-war period

After the death of I.V. Stalin, the authorities’ policy towards the church became tougher, and the state-church dialogue ceased. In practice, this manifested itself in the persecution of parishioners, the dispersal of worshipers in churches, and the closure of churches.

At the same time, which unfolded in the mid-1950s. the process of liberalization and expansion of opportunities for spiritual life could not but affect the position of the church. The priests who survived the camps and prisons were released. Since 1955, the presence of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate at receptions in the Supreme Council and in foreign embassies became the rule, which provided the opportunity for church hierarchs to directly communicate with state leaders and express their wishes. The Church was allowed to begin publishing the Bible and Gospel. The strengthening of the position of the church was so obvious that it again began to worry the party leadership, which realized that the forms and methods of ideological influence used until the mid-1950s turned out to be ineffective in the fight against the religious influence of the church.

Since the late 1950s. relations with the Russian Orthodox Church depended on the understanding of the role of atheism in the system of ideological work of the CPSU, when the idea of ​​building an atheistic society became dominant. In November - December 1958, a massive cleansing of church libraries took place, many spiritual books were confiscated, and foreign literature was placed under censor control. On November 28, 1958, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution “On measures to stop pilgrimages to the so-called “holy places.”

Since the 1960s A qualitatively new stage in relations between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church began, when the Moscow Patriarchate was called the ideological enemy of the party and government. In the mid-1960s. the church had only 18 operating monasteries in the USSR (as of 01/01/59 - 63; as of 01/01/60 - 44). The most ancient monastery, the Kiev Pechersk Lavra, was also among those closed. The New Program of the CPSU, which proclaimed the construction of a communist society by 1980, outlined a clear prospect for the Russian Orthodox Church: in 20-30 years it will have to cease to exist, since all citizens of the country by this time will become atheists. Religious customs and traditions were supplanted in every possible way, and new holidays and rituals were introduced instead (ceremonial registration of marriages, registration of the birth of a child, presentation of passports to teenagers, civil funeral services). In 1963, the authorities further intensified the anti-church campaign.

The violent anti-religious campaign ceased after the resignation of N. S. Khrushchev in 1964. As of January 1, 1966, the Moscow Patriarchate remained with 7,523 churches, 16 monasteries, and the number of registered clergy by 1967 was 7,410 people. At the same time, the religiosity of the population has not decreased, and in a number of regions even increased. The new leadership of the country, led by L.N. Brezhnev, abandoned the previous methods of fighting the church, switching to hidden tactics of ousting religious organizations from the internal life of the state.

Perestroika period

With the coming to power of M. S. Gorbachev, it became possible to reform a purely atheistic state, maximally loyal to the church. 1988 is a special year in the 70-year history of relations between the atheist state and the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1988, the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus' was celebrated by the state as an event of national significance. The events of August 1991 put an end to the 73-year existence of the Orthodox Church in an atheistic state. Moreover, in the early 1990s. Another trend emerged when the principle of religious associations before the law began to change in favor of the church.

The history of relations between the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church has had its ups and downs, tragic pages and periods of calm. The most important result of the development of the Orthodox Church in Soviet times was a sharp decline in its influence in society, which was caused not only by strong pressure from the state, but also by a deeper reason - the destruction of traditional society. Nevertheless, Orthodoxy managed to survive and prove its viability in the most difficult historical conditions.

Literature

Vasilyeva O. Yu. Russian Orthodox Church and Soviet power in 1917-1927. // National history. 1994. No. 13.

Pospelovsky D.V. The Orthodox Church in the history of Rus', Russia and the USSR. M., 1996.

Shkarovsky M.V. Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev. M., 1999.

Tsypin V. History of the Russian Orthodox Church. 1917-1990. M., 1994.



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Orthodox Church during the Soviet period

A few years before the October events of 1917, it was decided to restore the patriarchate in Russia, thereby increasing the role and influence of the church in the country. However, the Local Council, at which this was realized, opened only in August 1917. In November in Moscow, literally to the accompaniment of gunfire, Patriarch Tikhon (in the world V.I. Belavin, 1865-1925) was elected from three candidates by lot. The attitude of the Bolshevik authorities towards the church was hostile from the very beginning; moreover, the Bolsheviks almost immediately set a course for the destruction of the church. Mass repressions began against priests and monks, churches and monasteries were closed, Orthodox shrines were burned, and ancient architectural monuments were destroyed. The national culture suffered enormous irreparable damage. Patriarch Tikhon, enjoying considerable spiritual authority, tried to resist these atrocities. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the so-called renovationists - priests who began radical church reforms and supported Soviet power. The renovationist metropolitans Evdokim (until 1925), Veniamin and Vitaly (Vvedensky) enjoyed the favor of the authorities, and some church communities completely switched to the position of renovationism. Tikhon declared anathema to the Renovationists, but he himself was deprived of his dignity and monasticism by the “Renovationist” church council. From 1923 until his death, he was under house arrest in the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow, where he was buried. Patriarch Tikhon is now canonized as a saint of the Russian Orthodox Church. The renovationists themselves were not successful, many of them, in turn, were repressed. The next de facto leader of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Sergius of Starogorodsky (1867-1944), called on his flock to be loyal to the Soviet regime (for a short time he himself joined the renovationists, but later repented of this). Sergius was the locum tenens (temporary head in the absence of the patriarch) of the patriarchal throne (until 1937 he was the deputy of another locum tenens, Metropolitan Peter, who was arrested for “counter-revolutionary activities”, exiled to Siberia and shot in 1937). In 1921, another split occurred: a group of priests who stood in positions of irreconcilable struggle against Soviet power created in exile (the city of Sremski Karlovci in the former Yugoslavia) the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (foreign, or Karlovac, as it is sometimes called). This church, headed by the Metropolitan, did not differ in anything from the Russian Orthodox Church, except for its irreconcilable anti-Soviet and anti-communist position. Relations between the foreign church and the Russian Orthodox Church were severed after 1927. Its leaders believed that the Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia followed the lead of the godless communist government. In turn, the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, not without reason, blamed the “foreigners” for the split. Now the Orthodox Church Abroad has intensified its activities in Russia and has parishes in some cities.

Another branch of the official church, which arose due to the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church began to support the Bolshevik government, is the Catacomb Church, which exists autonomously, although in terms of worship and dogma it is no different from the Russian Orthodox Church. During the Great Patriotic War, the position of the Russian Orthodox Church changed dramatically: life forced the government led by Stalin to turn to the authority of the church in the name of victory. The Church, which traditionally stands for patriotism, made a huge moral and material contribution to the defeat of fascism. Temples began to reopen, and in 1943 Sergius was elected patriarch (a year before his death). A new wave of persecution hit the church during the Khrushchev Thaw. Although these persecutions were bloodless, they were morally very difficult. Despite some “freedom in art, literature, and poetry,” religion was severely oppressed at this time. N.S. Khrushchev promised to soon “show the people the last priest.” In the second half of the 60s. attitudes towards the church softened again. The Russian Orthodox Church emerged from a long period of persecution with its core core intact, but weakened. Its leaders were and are still accused of secret connections with the communist authorities and security agencies, but today we do not have (and probably will not have for a long time) sufficient grounds to confirm or refute these accusations. Yes, this is probably not the main thing. The important thing is that the church lives, has enormous authority and the opportunity to influence the process of revival of the country. After global changes in Russia in the late 80s and early 90s. The Russian Orthodox Church, like other churches operating in our multinational country, has become an important factor in social development. Since 1990, it has been headed by Patriarch Alexy II (A. M. Ridiger, born in 1929). The Church is looking for ways to intensify its missionary activities and is making a significant contribution to solving the most complex issues of modern life in Russia.

The role of religion in the war of 1941-1945

Realizing that victory over fascism is impossible without the unprecedented unity of the Soviet people, I. Stalin decides to use the religious feelings of the population. The punitive role of the state in relation to religion is significantly weakening. Using religion for selfish purposes and trying to please its military allies (who openly condemned the oppression of religion in the USSR), the Soviet government in 1942 officially allowed services to be held on Easter, and in 1943, under the auspices of Stalin, the election of a new Orthodox Patriarch took place.

Eyewitnesses confirm the holding of prayers for victory in many cities of the country in the winter of 1941. The Tikhvin Icon was even flown around Moscow by plane. All this, according to the government, contributed to raising the morale of the Soviet people. As you know, in war all means are good.

Often anti-religious propaganda in the USSR was beneficial to the Germans - they called their invasion of our territory a liberation one in order to actively restore churches in the occupied part of the country. The Soviet government needed to immediately correct this situation.

ORKSE lesson-module “From Soviet Russia to the present”

• December 29, 2014

Competition “My Pedagogical Initiative – 2014”

Nomination “Teaching and educational process in primary school”

The lesson-module “From Soviet Russia to the present” from the course “Fundamentals of religious cultures and secular ethics” for grade 4 is a reductive lesson script that is given to students for independent work with the textbook text or additional literature. The step-by-step learning of new material, characteristic of modular learning, is radically changed due to the nature of the learning tasks that orient students towards productive work.

Topic: From Soviet Russia to modern times

Lesson objectives:

• Educational - to acquaint students with the position of the Russian Orthodox Church after the revolution of 1917, the assistance of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War and its role in modern Russia.
• Developmental – development of critical and analytical thinking, skills in working with text, oral speech, and the ability to argue one’s point of view.
• Educational – instilling patriotism, developing a communicative culture, and listening skills.

During the classes:

1.Org. moment (1 min.)

Goal: organize and prepare students for work.

Greeting the teacher, checking attendance and readiness for the lesson. (The teacher welcomes students, creates an emotional mood, notes those absent in the journal.)

2.Checking homework (6 min) (frontal survey).

Goal : find out the level of preparation for homework.

Teacher. We will begin our lesson by trying to deduce the purpose of our lesson based on the title of the topic. What do you think is the purpose of our lesson?

Student 1: Find out more about the Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia.

Student 2: Determine the meaning of the Russian Orthodox Church from Soviet Russia to the present day.

Teacher: So, the topic of our lesson is: “From Soviet Russia to the present.”

The topic of the lesson is highlighted on the slide, and students write down the date and topic of the lesson in their notebooks.

3. Learning new material (23 min.)

Goal: Students’ awareness of the main content of educational material, students’ cognitive activity.

Teacher: Guys, now I suggest you work with the text of our paragraph (p. 25) and determine the significance of the Russian Orthodox Church in the life of our country from 1917 to the present.

Read the text of the paragraph, work through it using the “Marginal Notes” method and complete the tasks given to you in the flow chart.

Pupils read the textbook material and complete the task in their notebooks.

4. Reflection (3 min).

Purpose: Determining the level of assimilation of new material through performing a substitution exercise. Awareness of the importance of educational activities.

Teacher: Guys, the slide shows text with spaces. I suggest you read and fill in the blanks.

In 1917, instead of the Russian Empire, a new state arose - ..... The Bolsheviks began planting .... - denial of faith in God. Many representatives of the Orthodox Church did not recognize Soviet power, left Russia and created ….. ………… played an extremely important role in the fight against ………. The church inspired the population to fight against ………… and helped in collecting …………. With donations from Orthodox Christians, ..... and ...... were built and handed over to the troops. In 1943, the Soviet government allowed elections to be held ...., it became ...... The persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church stopped only in .... year. In 2007, the Act on..... between... was signed. And …..

The Church calls on Russians to love their….., their…. . and respect other peoples and languages. The Church pays special attention to the education of ….. and ….. of our country.

Students read aloud along the chain and insert the necessary words.

5. Summarizing.

Literature:

1. Federal state educational standard for primary general education // El. resource. Access mode: https://standart.edu.ru/catalog.aspx?CatalogId=959

2. The concept of spiritual and moral development and education of the personality of a Russian citizen // El. resource. Access mode: https://standart.edu.ru/catalog.aspx?CatalogId=985

3. Grigoriev VD. Social and spiritual in human upbringing // Educational work at school. – 2009. – No. 10.

4. Konysheva N.M. Project activities of schoolchildren//Elementary school. – 2006. – No. 1..

5. Fundamentals of religious cultures and secular ethics (results of the experiment and prospects of the training course) / Library of the journal “Bulletin of Education of Russia”. – 2012. – No. 1.

Author: Berdnikova Liliya Galimdzhanovna, teacher of social studies and ORKSE MBOU Gymnasium No. 90 of the Sovetsky district of Kazan.

Religion in the 1930s

Terror against religion increased significantly after the 1937 census, according to the results of which more than 70% of the population openly recognized themselves as believers. New arrests immediately followed: more than 32,000 “church members and sectarians” were convicted. There were about 200 bishops among them alone. Many of those from prison never returned.

The destruction of church property also continued. As a result, throughout the vast territory of the USSR before the start of the Great Patriotic War, there were only a few hundred surviving churches, many of which were used for other purposes.

Expert opinion

Mercury Stepan Igorevich

A prominent historian, expert in the field of research into the history of the USSR, member of the archaeological society, academician.

In Belarus, only one church functioned in a remote village - apparently that’s why it survived.